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The Department of Defense (DoD) has struggled with the issue of inadequate 
military family housing for decades.  Furthermore, Congress has made numerous 
attempts to resolve this problem culminating in the passage of the 1996 National Defense 
Authorization Act.  This Act allowed DoD to implement as many as twelve different 
authorities to meet this housing challenge, including the ability to form joint ventures 
with private corporations. 
The Navy’s innovative use of the joint venture authority has facilitated the 
renovation and creation of military family housing at an unprecedented scale and pace.  
This study provides an overview of the Navy’s use of the joint venture authority.  
Additionally, the concept of Transaction Cost Economics is explained and applied to the 
Navy’s contracting template for analysis. 
The research concludes that the twelve authorities, especially joint ventures, have 
provided effective means to resolve DoD’s military housing dilemma.  Additionally, the 
application of Transaction Cost Economics has proven beneficial to minimizing 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Since the end of the cold war there has been a steady drive for the military to cut 
costs and operate more efficiently.  One of the methods recognized as an effective is 
privatization.  There are numerous success stories of how privatization initiatives have 
saved the government money.  There are also a number of stories of how privatization 
was ineffective, more costly, or was not embraced by the Services.  This project will 
study the (MFH) privatization initiative.  It will explain the history of MFH, MFH 
privatization initiatives specific to the Navy, define and explain Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE), discuss how TCE can be applied to the MFH privatization process, 
and consider what lessons can be applied to improve the MFH privatization program. 
There are numerous reasons why military housing is a good candidate for 
privatization.  First, providing housing for military families is not “inherently 
governmental”, which allows outsourcing.  Second, military family members have lived 
in inadequate housing for decades. 
Chapter II will examine past MFH privatization initiatives.  Quality housing 
became a high priority issue for the Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1990s.  In 1995, 
Defense Secretary William J. Perry established the Quality of life Task Force charged 
with reviewing the DoD’s quality of life policies and housing programs.  The Task Force 
found major flaws with the MFH program and recommended that Congress approve new 
initiatives including allowing DoD to form partnerships (joint ventures) with private 
sector investors to obtain needed funding.  The joint venture initiative would allow DoD 
to access private sector capital and industrial resources for constructing new 
developments and renovating existing housing inventory.  The Task Force also called for 
an increase in housing allowances to eliminate out of pocket expenses for service 
members.  Many previous programs, including the Wherry, Capehart and Section 
801/802 programs, had failed to fully address the housing problem.  The National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1996 (P.L.104-106) created twelve authorities the Services 
could use to enhance MFH.  Initially, military housing privatization initiative (MHPI) 
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implementation was slow due to the complexity of the program and the need to apply it 
effectively across the four Services.  To address this issue, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) Competitive Sourcing and Privatization Office devolved the program to 
the Services, which facilitated a more rapid implementation of the privatization program. 
The Navy and Marine Corps have made extensive use of the joint venture 
authority.  Their concept is known as Public Private Ventures (PPV).  In a PPV program, 
the military partners with private industry to form Limited Liability Companies (LLC).  
The Navy and the private industry partner both provide equity to fund the partnership.  
The private partner then obtains the remaining funding from reputable lending 
institutions.  The Army uses the Request for Qualifications (RFQ) process for their MFH 
privatization program.  Under this process, the builders submit proposals for new housing 
developments with the contract awarded to the best-qualified builder.   Additionally, the 
Army guarantees occupancy over a lengthy period.  The developer will leverage the 
guarantees for up front loans to renovate existing housing and perform required 
maintenance.  When the contract expires, the housing units remain Army property.  The 
Air Force implemented its housing program similar to the Army’s RFQ process.  
However, its program focused on small developments away from operational areas.  
Also, the housing units could be sold if there was no occupancy due to such 
contingencies as a base closure. 
Chapter III will examine the Navy’s PPV program in more detail.  The mechanics 
of how the Navy partners with a private company to form an LLC will be explored.  
Additionally, PPV implementation is a complicated process that requires government 
oversight and support.  The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Special 
Venture Acquisition (SVA) Division has provided the necessary support and oversight to 
effectively implement this program.  Chapter III will also explain the business model of 
the PPV and how funds are raised for housing projects. 
Chapter IV will explain the concept of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).  TCE 
is an analytical tool allowing managers to determine if a product should be maintained 
within an organization (vertical integration) or obtained externally (privatized).  TCE 
may also help managers systematically analyze and support their decision making 
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process.  The TCE decision-making framework can be applied to MFH privatization 
determinations and point out weaknesses and concerns once a decision to privatize has 
been made.  Managers knowledgeable in TCE can then become more attentive to 
potential problems and conflicts and act to minimize opportunistic behaviors on the part 
of private partners. 
 Chapter V will examine the Navy’s application of TCE concepts in its PPV 
program.  It will also look at some specific situations where opportunistic behaviors may 
be a problem, and what has been done to minimize those risks. 
Chapter VI will expand on the Navy’s lessons learned process in regards to PPV 
and explain the use of their Program Manager’s Guide as a dynamic tool for collecting 
feedback from field representatives.  Furthermore, the Navy’s application of those 
lessons learned will also be covered. 
Lastly, Chapter VII will provide conclusions and recommendations for DoD and 
the Navy’s MFH privatization programs and the application of TCE to these initiatives.  
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II.  BACKGROUND:  MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION 
INITIATIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a history of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) new 
military housing privatization initiative.  It also reviews past housing initiatives, the 
motivations for the new attempt to fix DoD family housing problems, how the new 
initiative started, what it has accomplished, and current status. 
B. THE MARSH QUALITY OF LIFE TASK FORCE  
After decades of receiving a low level of attention, quality of life issues became a 
top priority issue for DoD in the 1990s with good reasons.  According to a 
comprehensive survey conducted in 1994 by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences, quality of life, pay, and housing topped a list of 53 
reasons soldiers gave for leaving the Army. (The Marsh Report, 1995) 
In 1995, Defense Secretary William J. Perry established the Quality of Life Task 
Force, which was headed by former Secretary of the Army Jack Marsh.  The task force, 
comprised of former military leaders and outside experts, was to review the military’s 
current quality of life policies and programs (Housing, Personnel Operations Tempo, and 
Community and Family Services), and to provide recommendations to improve the 
quality of military life. 
Many senior members of the defense department recognized housing as part of a 
bigger military quality of life equation, linked directly to the Armed Forces’ readiness, 
recruitment and retention.  At an Installation Commanders’ Conference in January 1995, 
Secretary Perry spoke: 
There are a few human needs in life more basic or important than a decent 
place to live.  Housing is certainly on our people’s mind.  Everytime I visit 
an installation and sit down with enlisted folks to hear their concerns, they 
bring up housing.  We have a special duty to ensure quality housing. (The 
Marsh Report, 1995)  
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At that time, DoD owned or leased about 387,000 family homes, with an average 
age of 33 years.  Deferred maintenance, repair, revitalization, and replacement costs had 
reached almost $20 billion, and 64 percent of those military homes were classified as 
“unsuitable.” (The Marsh Report,1995)  The Task Force found four major flaws with the 
current military family housing program financed through appropriated funds: 
• Funding was not sufficient to produce, maintain and operate quality 
housing adequately, as it was subject to cyclical changes often caused by 
political decision making, tight budgets, and competing priorities. 
• Current “scorekeeping” rules discouraged the use of private sector 
resources. 
• Housing policy was unclear, incomplete and lacked the vision and strategy 
to effect change.  The current policy promoted inequality between married 
and single service members, between residents of quality versus poor 
military housing, as well as resident of military housing and members 
residing off-base. 
• Many federal laws and regulations prevented the Defense Department’s 
usage of resources and best advantage of private industry. 
To resolve these problems, the Task Force recommended that the DoD focus on 
four housing goals: 
• Goal 1   Assure service members and eligible civilians access to 
affordable, quality housing. 
• Goal 2   Support near-term efforts, such as new legislative authority being 
considered by the 104th Congress, to expand housing resources and widen 
their impact. 
• Goal 3   Address other key near-term issues that impair housing delivery 
or cause members and families concern, such as policies, standards, 
procurement laws and regulations, and funding. 
• Goal 4   Identify an effective structure for an alternative Defense 
Department system to deliver and maintain quality housing at affordable, 
commercially comparable costs. 
To meet these goals, the Task Force recommended a three stage strategy be 
developed and implemented over three years.  (See Figure 1) 
  7
 
Figure 1.   Three Stage Strategy [From the Marsh Report] 
Stage 1 served as the catalyst for all future changes regarding military family 
housing.  The Task Force urged DoD to seek Congressional approval of new initiatives 
that would enable the military to partner with private investors, thus maximizing private 
sector funding.  These initiatives would enable access to private capital at reduced risk to 
the private investor and provided the DoD an array of tools for constructing new and 
modernizing existing housing. 
During Stage 2, the Task Force called for increases in housing allowances, 
eventually eliminating out of pocket expenses for service members, using relevant data 
such as the Housing Cost Index of the Consumer Price Index.  The Task Force also urged 
DoD to fence funding to aggressively revitalize existing bachelor housing and to 
prioritize use of appropriated funds to maintain/revitalize the current inventory, seed 
private sector joint ventures and only build new homes where the local communities were 
not willing or unable to provide housing. 
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To totally solve the housing problem, the Task Force recommended a 
“corporatized” Military Housing Authority be established.  This Authority, similar in 
concept to numerous state quasi-governmental agencies like or similar to the Australian 
Defence Housing Authority, would manage all aspects of the future military housing 
delivery system.  Housing development, maintenance and operations would be executed 
through local contracts with private industry. 
The Task Force envisioned that this Authority would be run by a small Board of 
Directors (Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, civilian experts, etc.).  There would 
also be a Board of Advisors which would consist of representatives from DoD and 
private industry; a head office to run day-to-day operations; and regional management 
centers to award and oversee local contracts. (The Marsh Report, 1995) 
C. THE ROAD TO MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION 
1.   Past Military Housing/Private Sector Initiatives 
The idea of partnering with private builders to build or revitalize military housing 
is, not new.  Congress and DoD had tried three times in the past to solve problems with 
the military family housing.  These three instances shall be discussed below. 
Wherry Housing.  In 1949, Congress passed P.L. 81-221 (a bill sponsored by 
Senator Wherry of Nebraska) to authorize private enterprises to build housing on federal 
land without use of appropriated military construction funding, and renting the housing to 
military personnel.  Service members retained their housing allowances, and paid rent to 
the private housing manager.  Reports that developers were pocketing “windfall” profits 
through building code violations and maintenance shortcuts resulted in Congressional 
oversight.  The program was terminated in 1955, after building approximately 84,000 
units. (Beard, 2003) 
Capehart Housing.  In an attempt to fix the Wherry housing program, Congress 
authorized a new housing initiative in 1955 called Capehart, named after Senator 
Capehart of Indiana.  Like the Wherry housing project, Capehart housing was built on 
federally controlled land, using private funds.  Unlike Wherry housing, where title to the 
resulting property remained with the private developers, DoD actually owned those 
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housing units and assumed the mortgage obligation, using housing allowances from the 
residing military personnel.  The Capehart program, however, met the same fate as the 
Wherry project.  Disputes with contractors and ballooning costs forced the Kennedy 
Administration to retire the Capehart program in 1962, after adding another 115,000 units 
to the DoD housing inventory. (Beard, 2003) 
Section 801 and 802 Housing.  Amidst the Reagan military buildup, Congress 
once again attempted to fix military housing with the Military Construction Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (P.L. 98-115).  The initiative encouraged private home builders 
to construct additional housing units on or near military installation for the service 
components to lease.  Section 801 was basically a build to lease program, where the 
military contracted with a private homebuilder to construct a new housing project and 
then leased those units.  Section 802 provided for a minimal occupancy rate or rental 
income for the housing project.  However, by 1993, property tax disputes coupled with 
long delays caused the program to become unpopular with private developers which 
effectively ended its use. (Beard, 2003) 
2.   The Military Housing Privatization Initiative  
Since the Wherry and Capehart programs and use of Section 801/802 had 
obviously failed to alleviate the housing problem, Congress tried something very 
different.  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106) 
created the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) as a five-year pilot program 
within a 10-year plan along with a funding threshold of $850 million to fulfill the goals 
outlined by the Marsh Task Force on Quality of Life (Reference).  The Authorization Act 
permitted DoD to entice private investment by acting more like a private enterprise.  Just 
as businesses can be creative and take full advantage of local real estate market 
conditions in designing development projects, the MHPI was intended to give similar 
flexibility to the DoD. (Else, 2001) 
3.   The Twelve Alternative Authorizations, or the MHPI “Toolbox” 
The MHPI includes twelve separate authorities that contain some of the 
provisions in earlier construction programs and adds to them, while permitting their 
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selective use where they can be most advantageous.  These “alternative authorizations” 
include: 
• Conveyance of real property:  The Government may transfer title of 
Federal property to private ownership. 
• Relaxation of Federal specifications for housing construction:  
Builders are allowed to construct housing in accordance with local 
building codes. 
• Inclusion of ancillary support facilities:  Bids for contracts may 
incorporate additional amenities, such as child care centers and dining 
facilities, to enhance the attractiveness of the basic housing. 
• Payment of rent by allotment:  Landlords make payment of rents 
through automatic electronic fund transfer from the appropriate Federal 
disbursing facility, guaranteeing cash flow. 
• Loan guarantee:  The Government may guarantee up to 80% of the 
private sector loans arranged by the property developer. 
• Direct loan:  The Government may make a loan directly to a contractor. 
• Differential Lease Payment (DLP):  The Government may agree to pay 
a differential between the BAH paid to Service members and local market 
rents. 
• Investment (Joint Venture):  The Government may take an equity stake 
in a housing construction enterprise. 
• Interim leases:  The Government may lease private housing units while 
awaiting the completion of a project. 
• Assignment of Service members:  Service personnel may be assigned to 
housing in particular project that they may otherwise not choose to occupy 
(tenant guarantee). 
• Build to lease:  The Government may contract for the private construction 
of a housing project, then lease its units (similar to the Section 801 
program). 
• Rental guarantee:  The Government may guarantee a minimal occupancy 
rate or rental income for a housing project (similar to the Section 802 
program). (Legislative Reference) 
4.   The MHPI Process 
Central features of the new housing initiative are flexibility and decentralized 
execution.  Most new MHPI projects follow this general pattern.  First, the appropriate 
Service conducts a study to determine whether additional housing is needed, either 
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through the renovation of existing housing or construction of new dwellings.  This study 
includes an evaluation of the local private housing market and a cost/benefit analysis 
comparing the use of an MHPI option and the traditional military construction route.  The 
results are briefed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Competitive Sourcing 
and Privatization office.  If the concept is judged adequate, it is approved and the Service 
is authorized to develop an appropriate solicitation proposal.  Congress is notified before 
the completed solicitation is issued to private industry and again when the successful 
solicitation response is selected and before a contract is awarded. (Else, 2001)  
5.   The MHPI Implementation   
In the beginning, the MHPI was centrally run by OSD Office of Competitive 
Sourcing and Privatization.  DoD contracting personnel were not familiar with the 
complexity inherent in this new approach to military housing construction:  unfamiliarity 
with these different kinds of negotiations, plus the new legal, financial, and budget issues 
that appeared as the program got underway.  Therefore, progress in negotiation of 
contracts and beginning construction was notably slower than originally envisioned.  For 
example, the first project award, known as NAS Corpus Christi/Kingsville-I (Texas) for 
404 units took place in July 1996.  The second, named Everett-I (Washington) and 
encompassing 185 housing units, was awarded in March of 1997.  In August 1998, 
another project was awarded at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas for 420 units. (Else, 
2001) 
This slow progress led to a 1997 decision by DoD to extend its original housing 
privatization target date of 2006 by four years to 2010.  In addition, a 1998 GAO report 
faulted the costs analysis methodology used by DoD, indicating that actual savings would 
be considerably less than the Services claimed, and suggested that more effective use 
could be made of existing private market housing near military installations.  (Else, 2001) 
In October of 1998, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen delegated operational 
responsibility of MHPI to the individual Services, with oversight and final approval 
authority vested in the Housing Revitalization Support Office (HRSO), under the OSD 
Office of Competitive Sourcing and Privatization.  In 2000, another project, Fort Carson, 
Colorado, for 2663 units, was finalized.  (Else, 2001) 
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As the MHPI expiration date approached (2001), Congress became concerned and 
extended the MHPI until 31 December 2004 with the Military Construction 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-246).  Subsequently the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-107) extended the MHPI’s term for another 
eight years, to 31 December 2012, allowing more time for DoD to complete its MFH 
privatization program. (Beard, 2003)  
D.   OVERVIEW OF THREE DEPARTMENTS’ MHPI IMPLEMENTATION 
1.    Three Ways of Executing the MHPI  
a. Navy/Marine Corps   
After a couple of years of initial close control of the privatization process, 
OSD later let the services run the program as they saw fit.  The Navy and the Marine 
Corps, whose privatization endeavor is the focus of this paper, viewed privatization not 
only as a way to improve housing, but also as an investment opportunity.  Through a 
program called Public Private Ventures (PPV), both the services teamed up with private 
industry to form limited liability companies to speed up military housing construction.  
The arrangement required the services to contribute equity up front, but also gave them 
the benefits of receiving revenues generated by the joint ventures.  The next chapter will 
discuss the PPV in more details. 
b.  Army 
The Army embarked on a different approach.  It is pursuing a “whole 
base” concept.  Through its housing privatization program called Residential 
Communities Initiative (RCI), the Army entered deals with private developers under a 
process named Request for Qualifications (RFQ).  Under the RFQ process, builders 
submit proposals for new housing developments and the RCI office awards the contract 
to the builder they think is best qualified.  For example, the Army picked Lend Lease 
Actus of Napa, California to revitalize nearly 6000 housing units at Fort Hood, Texas.  
The developer hired the architect who had designed the athletes’ village for the 2000 
Olympic game in Sydney, Australia to design Fort Hood’s new communities, complete 
with town centers, landscaping and drainage basins that double as ponds and streams.  
Under the deal, the Army guarantees Lend Lease Actus about $4 billion in housing 
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allowances over the next 50 years to own and operate all base housing.  In turn Lend 
Lease Actus will leverage those dollars for upfront loans to renovate and replace nearly 
5,000 units in the first 5 years of the contract and the rest by 2010.  Additionally, the 
developer will set aside some of the money for routine maintenance.  When the contract 
expires, the housing units become Army property. (Cahlink, 2001) 
c.  Air Force 
The Air Force meanwhile favored an approach opposite to that of the 
Army.  It focused on small developments that were to be built on military land off-base 
(away from the operational areas) and could be sold if service members no longer needed 
the housing or bases were to be closed due to Base Realignment and Closure.  Many of 
the Air Force housing privatization ventures are expected to follow the model developed 
at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB) in San Antonio, Texas where contractors were 
solicited to build housing through traditional requests for proposals that were judged on 
both cost and design.  At Lackland AFB the Air Force selected a developer based in 
Austin, Texas named Landmark Organization to build 321 new housing units that made 
up Tejeda Estates—and to operate and maintain them for the next 50 years.  The deal also 
required Landmark Organization to provide repairs and renovations for hundreds of other 
units over five decades.  In return, Landmark would receive the housing allowances of 
the service members living in those units and a lease for the land on which to build the 
units.  Furthermore, under the deal at Lackland the Air Force invested $6 million, 
compared to $48 million by Landmark and the Air Force will take over the ownership of 
those units when the contract expires. (Cahlink, 2001) 
2.   The Current Military Housing Status 
By 31 December 2003, 27 contracts for over 55,000 family housing units had 
been awarded with an estimated value of $5.9 billion in total development costs.  The 
private sector will assume 90 percent of the total costs with funding through loans, equity 
and/or projected operating income from the project.  The Services will fund the 
remaining $624 million in development costs through equity investment or direct 
government loan.  Listed below are the 27 privatized housing projects that have been 
awarded:  
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• NAS Corpus Christi (Kingsville I), Kingsville, TX 
• NS Everett I, Everett, WA 
• Lackland AFB, San Antonio, TX 
• Fort Carson, Colorado Springs, CO 
• Dyess AFB, Abilene, TX 
• Robins AFB, Warner Robins, GA 
• MCB Camp Pendleton , CA 
• NAS Kingsville II (Hunters Cove), Kingsville, TX 
• NS Everett II, Everett, WA 
• San Diego Naval Complex (Phase II), CA 
• Patrick AFB, FL 
• Fort Bragg, NC 
• Presidio of Monterey/Naval Postgraduate School, CA 
• MCB Camp Pendleton 2/MCB Quantico (CA & VA) 
• Fort Hood, TX 
• Elmendorf AFB, AK 
• San Diego Naval Complex (Phase I), CA 
• New Orleans Naval Complex, LA 
• South Texas, TX 
• Fort Lewis, WA 
• Fort Meade, MD 
• Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 
• Kirtland AFB, NM 
• Tri-Command Military Housing (Beaufort, Parris Island, SC) 
• Fort Campbell, KY 
• Fort Belvoir, VA 





Below is detailed information about results to date for each Service’s privatization 
participation: 



























Army 33,542 15,166 1,700 11% 12,293 2,524 21%
Air Force 5,486 3,820 1,661 43% 728 517 71%
Navy/Marines 16,068 6,922 2,133 31% 6,181 320 5%
Total 55,096 25,908 5,494 21% 19,202 3,361 18%
 
Table 1.   Newly Constructed and Renovated Units 
At the start of the program, OSD identified approximately 180,000 housing units 
as being inadequate and established a goal of planning for their elimination by 2007.  To 
date, over 40,000 of those inadequate units have been placed under contracts to be 
replaced or renovated. Based on the current pace, OSD is expected to increase that figure 
to over 100,000 units.  Table 2 shows the progress that the MHPI has had in eliminating 




Inadequate Housing Elimination Progress 
 Service Planned Actual 
FY 2002 Army 15,727 15,727 
 Navy/MC 6,583 6,583 
 Air Force 3,856 3,856 
 Total 26,166 26,166 
FY 2003 Army 23,533 23,533 
 Navy/MC 11,613 11,613 
 Air Force 4,938 4,938 
 Total 40,084 40,084 
FY 2004 Army 52,531 TBD 
 Navy/MC 34,601 TBD 
 Air Force 17,443 TBD 
 Total 104,575 TBD 
 
Table 2.   Planned vs. Actual Inadequate Housing Units Eliminated 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY       
While MHPI has not moved forward as rapidly as anticipated, it has significantly 
lessened the DoD’s chronic problem of inadequate housing.   The MHPI also has done 
better than previous privatization attempts (e.g., Wherry, Capehart, and Section 801 and 
802) since the designers of the initiative have incorporated many lessons learned from 
those attempts in the 12 Authorizations “Tool Box”.  Furthermore, the MHPI allows the 
Services to execute their programs as they see fit and that may contribute to future 
success.  In the next chapter, we will discuss details of the Navy’s Public-Private 




III.  CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY MILITARY 
FAMILY HOUSING PRACTICES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Special Venture 
Acquisition Program, under the direction of a senior executive service level director, is 
applying the legislative authorities enacted by the 1996 Defense Authorization Act.  
Figure 2 depicts a chart of the Special Venture Acquisition (SVA) organization. 
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Figure 2.   NAVFAC Special Venture Acquisition [From NAVFAC SVA] 
 
The SVA division is responsible for conducting financial analysis, establishing 
long-term limited partnerships with private corporations, and explaining program 
complexities to various organizations such as Congress and the Government 
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Accountability Office.  The Navy is implementing a major change in how the 
government has traditionally conducted new construction acquisitions of family housing. 
The remainder of this chapter will elaborate on the Navy’s use of the legislative 
authorities, specifically Section 2875, Investments (Joint Venture), originally authorized 
by the 1996 Defense Authorization Act.  (See Appendix A. for a copy of “10 USC 
Chapter 169 - Military Construction and Military Family Housing” listing all of the 
alternate authorities granted by Congress.)  It will also explore the Navy’s use of joint 
ventures in the form of Limited Liability Companies (LLC) to solve its housing dilemma.  
The following areas will be addressed:  Commander Naval Installations relationship with 
NAVFAC SVA, outside consultant support, audit agency review, life cycle cost 
comparisons, leveraging of funds, business model description, and the flow of funds. 
B. COMMANDER NAVAL INSTALLATIONS RELATIONSHIP 
Commander, Naval Installations (CNI) organization was established as a formal 
command on October 1, 2003 and is responsible for Navy-wide installation management.  
Its mission is “to provide consistent, effective, and efficient shore installation services 
and support to sustain and improve current and future Fleet readiness…” (CNI, 2003) 
One of the immediate benefits of standing up CNI was reducing the number of 
organizations responsible for planning, programming, budgeting, and executing resources 
from eight to one.  Sixteen regional commands report to CNI.  (See Appendix B. for 
command locations.)  CNI regions are listed below and segregated by commands located 




CONUS    OCONUS  
Navy Region Northwest  Navy Region Hawaii 
Navy Region North Central  Southwest Asia 
Navy Region Midwest  Singapore 
Navy Region Northeast  Japan 
Navy Region Southwest  Guam 
Navy Region South   Europe 
Navy Region Gulf Coast   
Navy Region Southwest 
Navy Region Mid-Atlantic   
Naval District Washington 
CNI is essentially the landlord of the Navy.  The CNI core staff consists of less 
than 200 personnel and is relatively small compared to the responsibilities assigned to it.  
(See Appendix C. for command organization chart.)  They soon recognized staffing 
shortfalls and have sought to develop strategic partnerships with organizations possessing 
the requisite technical knowledge and experience.  Strategic partners include the Naval 
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) for logistics support and the Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command (NAVFAC) for contract specialist support. (CNI, 2003) 
Through these relationships, CNI is free to determine the needs of each 
installation and translate those needs into requirements and specifications.  NAVFAC’s 
Special Venture Acquisition (SVA) program is assisting CNI in implementing initiatives 
and partnership arrangements to meet Navy-wide housing installation requirements in 
accordance with CNI’s requirements and specifications. 
C. CONSULTANT SUPPORT 
The SVA also realized that they needed to obtain the assistance of experts in 
establishing partnerships and navigating the legal pitfalls associated with contractual 
arrangements.  Due to the difficulty in identifying and evaluating prospective partner 
companies and the complexities associated with establishing partnerships, the SVA hired 
consulting services from Basile Bauman Prost & Associates, Inc (BBP).   
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BBP describes itself as assisting in all aspects of the Navy’s Public/Private 
Venture (PPV) program, currently assisting in 17 privatized housing programs.  BBP 
offers assistance using a two-tiered effort.  Consultants provide program level assistance 
at Naval Facilities headquarters and project level assistance in the field using a 
specialized team to assist individual installation PPV efforts.  (Basile Bauman Prost & 
Associates, 2004)      
BBP Associates promotes their company as “an economics and real estate 
development advisory firm which counsels an array of public and institutional clients, as 
well as both novice and sophisticated private investors, interested in bringing projects to 
fruition.”  They also list expertise in the following areas: 
• market and financial feasibility assessments    
• developer solicitations and evaluations 
• implementation and packaging assistance 
• deal structuring and negotiations    
• strategic planning and economic development analyses 
• resolution of public revenue shortfalls 
• military and federal property disposition 
• transportation/joint development planning 
• managing development organizations and projects 
• special expertise and services  
BBP Associates has a broad spectrum of clientele including:  all the armed 
services; cities and counties such as Boulder Colorado and Phoenix Arizona; state and 
local governments such as the California Transportation Commission and State of 
Florida; college and universities such as Johns Hopkins and MIT; and private developers 
such as Ford Motor Land Development Company and the Marriott Corporation. 
D. AUDIT AGENCY REVIEW 
BBP Associates has provided the SVA division innovative and progressive 
guidance through some rather complex financial analysis and legal structure development 
in the form of limited partnership arrangements.  The SVA has also developed 
relationships with another agency to analyze the results of these arrangements. 
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The Director of Acquisitions for Naval Facilities Headquarters (NAVFAC HQ) 
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Assistant Director, Operations 
Headquarters, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) in April 2004.  This agreement 
formalized the services that the DCAA is currently providing the SVA in helping to 
evaluate the effectiveness/appropriateness of NAVFAC’s privatization efforts at no 
charge.  DCAA is a separately funded federal agency.  Some of the key services include: 
serving as the DCAA focal point to NAVFAC relative to the housing privatization 
efforts. 
 
• performing financial capability assessments. 
• participating in pre-award financial evaluations. 
• analyzing proposed annual operating budgets to assist contract officers in 
determining reasonableness and compliance with business agreements. 
• evaluating the system of internal controls related to escrow accounts and 
performing cash flow analysis.  Assisting in obtaining audit services for 
necessary reviews. 
• assisting in developing a system of internal controls to support the DON 
policy, procedures, and guideline objectives for business and property 
management. 
• analyzing management and financial reports and report findings/ 
recommendations to assist in NAVFAC’s financial and management 
performance of the program. 
• performing risk assessment for changes to the operating agreements, 
purchase and/or disposition of assets, changes to the composition of the 
members or partners, etc., to identify any increase in risk to the 
Government. 
Another key component of this MOU is the assignment of a full-time Financial 
Liaison Advisor (FLA) from the DCAA to the SVA organization.  This individual is also 
listed in the “NAVFAC Special Venture Acquisition” organization chart, Figure 2.  The 
terms of this agreement require a review of the document at least once every three years.  
Additionally, the agreement is subject to termination by either party with a 120-day 
notice. (DCAA, 2004) 
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E. LIFE CYCLE COST COMPARISONS  
In compliance with a recommendation made by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), a life-cycle comparison between military construction (MILCON) costs 
and Military Housing Privatization initiative (MHPI) project costs has been implemented 
into the project approval process.  These cost comparisons must be based on projects of 
identical scope, quality, amenities, and duration.  A memo signed out on November 12, 
2003 by the Director, Housing and Competitive Sourcing, details the guidance issued to 
the Services in determining life-cycle costs. (Sikes, 2003) 
The memo identified some underlying assumptions in conducting these 
comparisons.  These are: 
• constant (real) dollar analysis – used to measure costs in units of stable 
purchasing power. 
• discount rate – required by OMB Circular A-94 using the Treasury 
Department cost of borrowing funds. 
• inflation – nominal or inflated dollars should not be used. 
• base year of analysis – should be the first year in which there would be a 
difference in expenditures between the two alternatives, generally the first 
year of the project. 
• period of analysis – must be identical to comparative alternatives.  Where 
alternatives have different economic lives, the longest is used as the basis 
for the comparison and an adjustment is made for the unequal life by 
computing the costs of extending the alternative with the shorter life. 
• initiative to increase housing allowances – must reflect proposed increases 
in basic allowance for housing and the Service’s recoupment of the 
increase in allowances due to the budget increase to achieve zero out-of-
pocket as return to the government. 
Sunk costs, including government-owned land and improvements are not included 
in this comparison. 
Some of the key cost considerations for MILCON are construction costs, 
renovation, demolition, design, out-year revitalization, school impact aid, and operations 
and maintenance using market data from the Institute of Real Estate Management 
(IREM). 
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Alternatively, some of the key cost considerations for privatization are: project 
planning (including consultant costs), construction inspection, basic allowance for 
housing, portfolio management, school impact aid, housing management personnel, and 
credit scored amount.   
Congressional “scoring” is a fundamental part of determining the government’s 
upfront obligation to a housing privatization project.  This is how the Federal 
Government budgets for the cost of governmental activities such as military family 
housing.  It is the percentage of dollar value, from 0% to 100%, of a project’s cost that 
must be allocated to an agency’s budget in a given fiscal year.  (DoD MHP, 2004)  Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) scoring guidelines require fully funding a project 
with sufficient budget authority in its first year to cover the Government’s long-term 
financial commitment to the project. 
The graphic depicted in Figure 3 is an example of how the government would 
score a privatization project for four of the legislative authorities granted by the 1996 
Defense Authorization Act. (See Appendix A. for a complete listing of the legislative 
authorities.) 
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Figure 3.   Reason for Government Contribution [From Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations) Housing and Competitive Sourcing] 
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The “Reason for Government Contribution” example lists estimated construction 
costs of $40 million.  As a result of the limited partnership between the Navy and a 
private entity, $34 million ($30 million plus $4 million) of private industry funds are 
obtained to finance a military family housing project.  The remaining funds, termed 
“Development Gap” are obtained from funds allocated to the Department of the Navy 
and also make up the congressionally “scored” amount for this project.  The amount of 
scored funds in this example is $6 million, representing 15 percent of total funding 
authority for the project’s first year.  This amount is also listed next to the “Government 
Equity” caption under the “Scoring” column of Figure 3. 
F. LEVERAGING OF FUNDS 
Military Construction (MILCON), requires fully funding the cost of military 
housing by Congress in a given fiscal year.  (10 USC Sec. 2807)  In contrast, 
privatization using joint ventures allows leveraging Federal funds by accessing outside 
industry funding for housing construction and renovation costs.  Leveraging of Federal 
Government funds may be one of the most important benefits of the Navy’s and the 
Department of Defense’s privatization program. 
Financial leveraging is defined as “an increase in the rate of return larger than the 
increase in explicit financing costs—the increased rate of return on owner’s equity when 
an investment earns a return larger than the after-tax interest rate paid for debt financing.” 
(Stickney and Weil, 2003)  This concept is allowing the government to eliminate 
inadequate housing in an unprecedented scale. (DoD MHP, 2004)  Department of 
Defense policy requires a minimum leverage of three to one for a privatization project to 
be considered acceptable.  This means a privatized project must generate at least $3 of 
housing development for every $1 appropriated by Congress. (PEP, 2003) 
The leverage ratio for individual projects is calculated by dividing the estimated 
costs for a project under MILCON by the project’s total budget score.  The amount of 
leverage achieved on a given project is a function of several factors, such as project size, 
location, and deal structure. 
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Figure 4 shows the amount of all homes produced by the Navy with private 





















# of Units • 18,000 homes since 1996
– Kingsville, TX (I & II)
– Everett, WA (I & II) 
– Camp Pendleton, CA
– San Diego, CA
– New Orleans, LA
– Corpus Christi/Ingleside, TX
– Beaufort/Parris Island, SC
– San Diego PH II, CA
– Camp Pendleton, CA (II)/Quantico, VA
– Hawaii PH 1 
• $1.9 billion Total Development Cost 





Figure 4.   DoN Executed Projects [From NAVFAC SVA] 
 
This figure illustrates that for every dollar the Department of the Navy (DoN) 
invested in a project they received over seven dollars in housing development ($1.9B ÷ 
$265M = 7.17). 
The leveraged funds are obtained through a partnership formed between the 
government and the private company.  This partnership is intended to minimize the 
government’s financial risk.  Essentially, the government and the partner contribute an 
amount of funds to the partnership.  It is then up to the private partner to obtain the 
remaining construction financing.  This financing is obtained from various reputable 
sources such as banks, venture firms, and bond issues. 
G. BUSINESS MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) uses a joint venture concept, which 
establishes a Limited Liability Company (LLC) with a non-governmental partner(s).  
These partnerships last as much as 50 years, with DoN holding a minority interest in the 
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partnerships.  Minority membership allows the Navy to have a voice in the key decisions, 
without having to manage day-to-day operations.  Some of the key decisions are 
admission of additional members, refinancing or taking out additional debt, disposition of 
company assets, changes in the distribution of cash flow, replacement of the property 
manager, and changes in project ownership. 
Construction efforts are no longer constrained by government competitive bidding 
rules and regulations. Additionally, there are a number of economic advantages to 
seeking outside industry involvement in revitalizing military family housing.  These are 
using private sector capital as a financial leveraging tool, incorporating the latest industry 
construction standards into the development, and implementing business management 
best-practices in the delivery of homes to all military families. 
A partnership also offers advantages to a private partner.  The company can look 
forward to receiving rent in the form of basic housing allowances from military tenants.  
This income is not guaranteed, but the partner is allowed to fill vacant units with local 
residents.  The Navy is generally allowed a 30-day preferential referral period before the 
unit is made available to the general public.  Additionally, the property will operate like a 
private rental property with tenants signing leases, paying for their own utilities, and 
subject to federal/state/local landlord-tenant laws based on the local jurisdiction. 
The following graphic depicted in Figure 5 details a brief overview of the LLC 












Finance, Design, Construct, Acquire, Own,
Lease, Convey, Operate, Manage, Maintain,
and/or Renovate Housing for Military Families 
NAVY HOUSING, LLC
OPERATING AGREEMENT
No longer Navy 
Housing
Private Entity
• Establishes the Business Entity – LLC
























Figure 5.   Business Model [From NAVFAC SVA] 
 
The Navy and the private entity both contribute equity.  Once the partnership is 
formalized, the Navy becomes a minority partner and leaves the day-to-day operations to 
the discretion of the private partner.  The private partner can either perform these 
functions in-house or subcontract out responsibilities such as design, construction, 
renovations, property management, etc. in the form of operating agreements.  
Additionally, the private partner will also obtain the financing needed to fund the 
remainder of the project. 
The “No longer Navy Housing” caption in the figure listed above refers to the 
properties being managed very much like commercial properties.  As previously 
mentioned, tenants are required to sign leases, pay their own utilities, and are subject to 
tenant-landlord laws and regulations.  Figure 6 describes the transition of responsibilities 





Upon execution of the business agreements, the Managing Member assumes full responsibility for 
developing, operating, and managing the occupancy of family housing.
 
 
Figure 6.   Transition of Responsibility [From NAVFAC SVA] 
 
This graphic details the sequence of events leading up to the partner assuming a 
majority role in the partnership.  Initially, the Navy needs to articulate a requirement to 
private industry and potential partners.  Once a partner is identified, the next step is to 
legalize the partnership.  Eventually, the partnership will be formed and operations will 
begin to stabilize.  There will be a point in the partnership when all construction 
requirements have been met and the private partner will have assumed the lead in 
managing daily operations.  Table 3 lists the partnerships that have been formed at 
various sites throughout DoD. 
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Project Privatization Company Property Management Company
Kingsville I Landmark Organization, LP Faulkner USA
Kingsville II Hunt Building Corp. HBC Property Managers
Everett I Arlington Housing, LLC Dujardin Property Management Co.
Everett II Gateway Everett, LLC Pinnacle Realty Management
New Orleans New Orleans Navy Housing, LLC Patrician Development LLC
San Diego I/II Lincoln/Clark San Diego LLC Lincoln BP Management, Inc.
South Texas South Texas Navy Housing, LLC Capstone Real Estate
Beaufort Tri-Command Military Housing LLC Tri-Command Property Management LLC
Pendleton I De Luz Housing, LLC Hunt Building Corporation
Pendleton 2 Camp Pendleton & Quantico Housing, LLC Lincoln BP Management, Inc.  
 
Table 3.   DoN Partners 
H. FLOW OF FUNDS 
 The Department of the Navy has a firmly established method for 
allocating the flow of funds generated by the rental income earned from military families.  
The term used by the SVA to describe this funding allocation is a “Cascade of LLC 




Cascade of LLC Funds
Gross Rental Income
Minus Vacancy Loss
= Effective Rental Income
Minus Total Operating Expenses (1), includes Base Property Management Fee
= Net Operating Income
Minus First Mortgage Debt Service (2)
= Net Cash Flow
Minus Asset Management Fee (3)
Minus Long Term Recapitalization and Project Reserve Accounts (4)
Minus Property Management Incentive Fees (5)
= Remaining Cash Flow Split




Figure 7.   Cascade of LLC Funds [From NAVFAC SVA] 
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Fund allocation percentages are not included in the figure listed above due to the 
business sensitive nature of the information and the possibility for fund fluctuations 
specific to each negotiated partnership.  The following numbered paragraphs correspond 
to the numbers listed in the “Cascade of LLC Funds” figure and will cover each 
allocation in more detail. 
(1)  Total operating expenses include maintenance, support services, personnel, 
administration, property taxes, and insurance.  The asset manager is responsible for 
preparing the budget, which is then submitted for the Navy’s approval annually. 
(2)  After operating expenses are met, the next funding allocation goes to 
servicing mortgage debt.  This is the debt incurred by the partner through loans, bond 
issues, venture capital investors, etc. 
(3)  The net cash flow is then distributed to the asset manager.  The asset manager 
is responsible for the overall performance of the company and ensuring the company 
satisfies obligations over the long term.  Obligations include conformance with loan 
documents, compilation of budgets, protection of asset value, contracting on behalf of the 
partnership, and negotiating with municipalities.  This fee for service structure provides a 
financial incentive for the asset manager to maximize the efficient operation of the 
company, which in turn will help maximize total income for the company. 
(4)  Long Term Recapitalization Funds Accounts (LTRA) were established to 
maintain quality homes/neighborhoods over time and establish a Project Reserve Account 
(PRA) to enable the partnership to address any deficits in Family Housing.  Fund 
withdrawals are subject to Navy approval. 
(5)  Property Management Incentive Fees are based on performance indicators.  
Some of these indicators are independent resident satisfaction surveys, dwelling make 
ready (turnaround) efficiency, response time to service requests, and semi-annual 
inspections conducted by a Navy member representative, property manager 
representative, and an independent inspector. 
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(6)  The Operating Reserve Account was created as a guard against unforeseen 
negative financial impacts due to such things as utility spikes, emergency repairs and 
maintenance, and additional amenities.  Fund disbursement requires Navy approval. 
(7)  Private Return is the last money out of the project and is not guaranteed.  The 
funds, if any, are split between the Navy’s Operating Reserve Account and partners 
Private Return.  It is essentially the private sector’s return on equity. 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The DoN was the first to use the limited liability partnership concept of 
conducting business with positive results.  Commander Naval Installations and Naval 
Facilities Headquarters have formed a strategic partnership with the goal of privatizing 
over 86 percent of Navy family housing by 2008.  Currently, they have privatized over 
18,000 units out of a total of 70,000 of the Department of the Navy’s housing inventory. 
Due to the complexities inherent in forming partnerships with private industry, the 
Navy has obtained the consulting services of Basile Bauman Prost & Associates, Inc. an 
expert in this particular field.  The consulting services have allowed the Navy to 
successfully privatize multiple projects in disparate geographical locations dealing with a 
myriad of state and local regulations with swift progress.  Additionally, Navy 
privatization efforts have won the accolades of Congress.  Recently, the Navy obtained 
the services of the Defense Contract Audit Agency via a memorandum of understanding 
to help evaluate their privatization initiatives.   This relationship will provide the added 
benefit of fine tuning consulting service support. 
One of the key considerations in pursuing a privatization effort is determining the 
difference in life cycle costs between military construction (MILCON) costs and 
privatization costs.  The Navy has shown a savings over MILCON and has also received 
favorable budget scoring (an example of scoring is given in Section E of this chapter) for 
only the equity portion of a limited liability partnership with a private entity.  
Additionally, partnership efforts have allowed the Navy to achieve an overall seven-to-
one return for each dollar invested in housing construction by the Federal Government. 
(NAVFAC, 2004) 
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The limited liability corporation business model has revolutionized how the Navy 
conducts business with private industry.  This arrangement offers economic, service, and 
construction quality benefits to both parties and requires a long term commitment.  The 
flow of funds from rent obtained in the form of basic housing allowances is critical to the 
economic benefits.  After all debts are satisfied, remaining funds can be shared by the 
partners.  Funds returned to the U.S. Treasury might be reprogrammed back to the 





































IV.  TRANSACTION COSTS ECONOMICS (TCE) 
Since building and fixing the military housing costs are so high, outsourcing has 
been used and considered as a method to attain cost savings.  However, there is no clear 
framework to help DoD managers to determine which functions, contracting tools or 
conditions make outsourcing a good option.  Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) 
concepts with assets specificity could provide the tool to help managers better judge the 
outsourcing option.  It seeks to explain why certain functions are better to compete in the 
market to achieve cost savings and efficiency and why other functions should be retained 
internally.  Oliver Williamson, the founder of TCE said that TCE seeks “economizing 
transaction costs.” (Williamson, 1985)  TCE with its characteristics of high specificity, 
low frequency, and increase uncertainty will required a completed contract with clear 
details to prevent opportunistic behavior.  This chapter will describe the major concepts 
of TCE, how they affect outsourcing “make or buy” decisions.  This will lead to the 
discussion of opportunistic behavior and contracting solutions. 
A. DEFINITION OF TCE THEORY  
This chapter focuses on transaction cost economics when two or more parties 
agree to exchange or transfer goods or services.  The transaction can be seen as a form of 
contract.  The costs associated with that transaction include the costs of setting up the 
contract, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing the contract’s performance.  Further 
transaction costs during the time contracts take place can be referred to as maladaption 
costs.  TCE is a very powerful theoretical framework that seeks to reduce maladaption 
costs and focuses on organizational efficiency.  William (1985) defined product costs as 
being analogous to the cost of building and running an “idea machine”, while transaction 
costs are those costs which are incurred by departures from perfection.  Three attributes 
of transactions are asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty. 
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B. MAKE OR BUY DECISION 
The “make or buy” decision is the major part of outsourcing.  Transaction costs 
economics framework tries to determine whether it is efficient and economical for the 
firm to produce goods or services internally.  A firm will choose to acquire goods or 
services from the market if they are less expensive and are in the same or better quality 
than what it can produce internally. In order to determine if outsourcing is a good 
decision, organizations must evaluate all relevant costs to see if goods or services can be 
provided by an outside firm at a lower cost and still keep the same or provide a better 
quality.  If the quality of goods or services is less, then it is not a good reason to obtain 
them from an outside firm. 
Contracting costs and monitoring costs should also be considered in the decision 
of outsourcing.  In addition, intangible costs, internal costs, and external costs need to be 
included.  Intangible costs are hard to defined costs which include the loss of control in 
the contract, loss of worker morale, and loss of flexibility.  Internal costs exist regardless 
if an activity is performed internally or externally.  An example of internal costs is 
contract administration costs which should be included when a function or a product is 
outsourced.  The contract administration costs are often the costs to set up the contract or 
the disposal costs.  Sometimes, an organization overlooks infrastructure cost when 
outsourcing. Although infrastructure costs often exist when the function is produced 
internally, but still exists when a function is produced externally.  Outsourcing by 
implication participating in the free market can be cheaper due to competition.  The more 
common an item or standard an operation function is, the more likely the cost will be 
cheaper in the market.  The market not only can provide cost savings, it can provide 
better quality through competition. Whenever there are more suppliers, the customer 
power increases.  Outsourcing in this situation is efficient.  On the other hand, when the 
asset specificity is high, then opportunistic behavior will be more likely to happen.   In 
these situations producing goods or services internally is a good option.  It is better for 
the organization to retain the function that is more complex and requires specialized 
resources investment.  Franck and Henderson noted a decline in the number of buyers 
and sellers also can lead to bargaining problems. (Vertical Coordination of Marketing 
  35
Systems)  With specialized assets, the bargaining power in the market will decrease and 
the potential for opportunistic behavior will increase because the alternative exchanges 
cannot be switched to easily.  For example, no organization would choose to produce 
their office supplies since these supplies are a lot cheaper in the market.  There is a lot of 
competition in the market, the organization can get the supplies with higher quality and at 
a lower price than if it chooses to produce the supplies internally.  Whenever there is less 
competition, high prices and greater contracting and monitoring cost will take place.  If 
the transaction cost and monitor cost becomes too expensive, the firm should retain the 
functions. 
C. VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
In order to reduce opportunistic behavior, firm should decide to produce in-house 
since opportunism can be more easily suppressed within the firm.  (Stephen & Love 
2000) Asset specificity has been seen as the driving force behind Vertical integration.   
Contractual incompleteness, and its interaction with different types of transactional 
attributes including asset specificity, complexity, and uncertainty, plays a major role in 
the relative costs of governance through outsourcing versus through internal organization.  
When transactions take places through market as a contract, the buyer and seller may 
have some conflicting interests.  For example, in the situation where the buyer and seller 
are locked into a bilateral trading relationship, in the sense that the cost of continuing the 
bilateral trading relationship is higher than terminating it and choosing alternative buyers 
and sellers.  In this situation either one or both parties may have the incentive to take 
advantage of their own interests.  Vertical integration in this case has more potential 
advantages than outsourcing since the internal organization is likely to better harmonize 
these conflicting interests and provide smoother adaptation and operate more efficiently 
in coping with changing supply and demand conditions over time.   As Williamson (1971 
pp.116-117) noted: 
… The contractual dilemma is this:  On the one hand, it may be 
prohibitively costly, if not infeasible, to specify contractually the full 
range of contingencies and stipulate appropriate responses between stages.  
On the other hand, if the contract is seriously incomplete in these respects 
but, once the original negotiations are settled, the contracting parties are 
locked into a bilateral exchange, the divergent interests between the 
  36
parties  will predictably lead to individually opportunistic behavior and 
joint losses.  The advantages of integration thus are not that technological 
(flow process) economies are unavailable to non-integrated firms, but that 
integration harmonizes interests (or reconciles differences, often by fiat) 
and permits and efficient (adaptive, sequential decision process to be 
utilized…    
Vertical integration is favored when the benefits of mitigating opportunistic 
behavior problem by moving the transactions inside the firm.  Vertical integration in this 
situation provides a reduction of transaction costs associated with relationship-specific 
transactions. 
D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASSET SPECIFICITY, TRANSACTION 
COSTS AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
Vertical integration is chosen to minimize transaction costs.  For low specificity, 
(k < k1) transaction cost of the market are minimal.  As asset specificity increases to 
intermediate levels (k1 < k < k2) contracting is a good option since it minimizes 
transaction costs.   For transactions with high levels of asset specificity (k > k2) vertical 
integration becomes favorable for its cost-minimizing (see graph below).  
 




E. OUT SOURCING PROBLEMS   
Outsourcing has many problems, as the functions become more complex and 
require higher specificity as mentioned above, the more problems must be considered 
before determining if outsourcing is the best option for organization.  The concept of 
opportunistic behavior and assets specificity in transactions cost economic will provide a 
better tool to improve outsourcing decisions. 
1. Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity is defined as an investment in assets specifically relevant for a 
particular transaction.  It can be in the form of physical assets related to locations or 
tangible assets that can not be easily duplicated.  Asset specificity plays an important role 
in transaction costs economics because it creates market imperfections and allows assets 
owners to earn rents.  Once an asset is tied to a specific service, then it is difficult to 
withdraw.   Because relationship specific assets have much lower value in other uses by 
other users, they reduce the number of potential trading partners. (Williamson 1999).  
Thus, one party might exploit the other party’s vulnerability.  For example, an investment 
in an aircraft in DoD is very expensive to reverse.  DoD will be locked into that 
commitment for a long time. Certainly, there will be a dependent situation, that gives 
them not much flexibility, and in some cases, inefficiency for the long-term.  This 
problem can be referred to as opportunistic behavior.  The more specificity an asset has to 
a transaction, the more likely a hold up may take place.  William (1985) identified four 
types of asset-specificity, three of which are related to the physical assets of production, 
and the fourth to the specialized skills of the people involved in the work process. 
• Physical asset specificity refers to an investment that is made in 
specialized equipment or tooling designed for a particular product or 
customer 
• Site specificity: a buyer and a seller locate their facilities next to each 
other to reduce inventories or transportation costs.  For example, a 
producer locates a farm operation close to a processor to reduce 
transportation costs. 
• Dedicated asset specificity is an asset or piece of equipment that is 
required to manufacture a product for a particular buyer.  For example a 
dedicated software that the supplier and buyer use to track their inventory 
and orders. 
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• Human asset specificity is the past investment that people made in 
education, skills, and experience, which they use in carrying out their 
work. 
2. Frequency 
The effect of frequency on transaction cost is strong, especially when the 
specificity level is high.  There will be fewer buyers and supplier in the market to 
exchange the service or product.  Since the product is rare or unique, it costs more to 
make that product.  Low frequency along with assets specificity will more likely create 
opportunistic behavior that is why frequency is very crucial in transaction costs 
economics.  Given a choice, a firm would not want to produce or provide a good or 
services in house that is very rarely used.   For example, most firms will not want to set 
up their own management consultant department because they only use the services of a 
management consultancy on a very infrequent basis. 
3. Uncertainty 
When there are many relevant unknown factors in a transaction, it can be 
described as uncertainty.  It is hard to see the things that might happen during the course 
of transaction.  One obvious factor is the length of time during which transaction will 
occur. Transactions that happen in a short period time will have relatively little 
uncertainty.  Transactions surround by little or no uncertainties require minimal 
governance because all the information about the transaction is available to all parties.  
By contrast, uncertainty in defining and observing performance makes it difficult to 
contract based on that performance. 
F. OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR 
Opportunistic behavior refers to the possibility that people will act in a self 
interest way.  People may not be entirely honest about their intention or they might 
attempt to take advantage of the unforeseen situation that gives them a chance to exploit 
the other party.  Transaction cost depends on the transaction (According to Economics 
USDA).  When transaction costs are high, there is the possibility of “opportunistic 
behavior”. Transactions can also be affected by uncertainty.  Uncertainty can happen 
because of opportunistic behavior of the individuals or an uncertain environment.   For 
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example, information may not be distributed equally.  Where one party to a transaction 
has more or better information than the other, the possibility of opportunistic behavior 
may happen by itself.  When products are not standard and require a specific investment, 
opportunistic behavior is likely to happen. 
G. CONTRACTING 
A contract is used to reduce risk and facilitate the exchange of goods and services 
between partners. The exchange can involve performing work, or delivering goods or 
services in return for payment.  If a contract is carefully constructed, it could provide 
some safeguards to protect the interests of both parties.   Williamson defines contracting 
as planning, promises, competition, and governance. (Williamson, 1985)  There are two 
types of contracting, implicit and explicit contracting.  The implicit contracting relies on 
acceptance by the contracting parties of organizational norms and what is understood 
informally to be good and bad performance.   If organizations operate in an environment 
in which partners trust each other, there will be less need for formal contracts. 
(Williamson, 1999)  Implicit contracts can be used in this case.  However, in order to 
enforce specific performance and reduce the opportunistic behavior problem, the 
contracting description must be sufficiently explicit.  Williamson (1999) notes that one 
way to insure against opportunistic behavior is to write a detailed contingent contract that 
specifies all possible eventualities and is watertight against all forms of opportunism. (p. 
300).  In most contracting environments, there will more likely be both explicit and 
implicit contracting rather than the extremes of wholly implicit or explicit contracting. 
H. TCE EXAMPLE 
A hypothetical example of TCE application in a business could be from a wine 
maker.  Blue Sky Winery (BSW) is considering if it should continue to grow its own 
grapes or to buy grapes from grape growers.  To buy the grapes could provide some cost 
savings.  BSW believes that their farming operation is not economical and that it could 
buy grapes at a lower price.  BSW entered into an agreement to buy grapes from Valley 
Grape Farm (VGF) who is one of the few wine grape growers in the region.  BSW can 
purchase grapes from VGF for $1,800 per ton while it cost BSW $2,100 to produce a ton 
of grapes. 
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If there are a limited number of grape buyers and sellers in the region, if VGF and 
BSW do not have a well written contract they could develop opportunistic behavior.  For 
example, VGF could increase the price for its grapes or does not produce enough to meet 
BSW’s requirement.  BSW could also develop opportunistic behavior by forcing VGF to 
sell the grape at a loss.  Because of spoilage and transportation costs contribute to the site 
specific of the grape grower and buyer VGF and BSW could develop a bilateral contract 
which reduces competition.  Both VGF and BSW need to consider the asset specificity 
issue.  If VGF anticipates an increase in grape demand because of BSW and purchases 
additional grape farm equipment and plants additional grapes over other potential crops it 
has made investments in specific assets and physical plant in anticipation of BSW’s 
intentions.  BSW on the other hand may decide to divest of its grape growing assets 
including human assets in this area in anticipation that VGF can provide the required 
grape at a lower price.  One can see that this arrangement has risks involved with it which 
may cause BSW or VGF to not want to enter. 
I. SUMMARY OF THE FRAMEWORK OF TCE 
TCE is a good tool to help managers analyze efficient investing in transaction 
specific assets and reduce the potential for opportunistic behavior.  With the 
understanding of TCE, the transaction costs can be reduced to some extent.  However, 
bounded rationality which means that human’s memories and ability to process 
information are limited, prevents contracts from specifying all possible contingencies and 
therefore the potential for opportunistic behavior cannot be completely eliminated.  As 
contracts become flexible, they allow more potential for opportunistic behavior.  
Therefore, asset specificity and recognitions of opportunistic behavior would give 
managers a better tool to reduce the transaction costs in contracts.  In short, firms should 
only internalize transactions that they can govern more effectively than through markets 
or contracts. 
  41
V. TRANSACTIONAL COST ANALYSIS OF THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF FAMILY HOUSING AT NAVAL COMPLEX 
SAN DIEGO, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 
This chapter will examine the contract, used by the Navy Region Southwest, 
using Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Theory.  It will focus on how the Navy Region 
Southwest’s agreement applied lessons learned from the military housing Public Private 
Venture (PPV) done in Everett, Washington to avoid any opportunistic behavior.  This 
section will also examine the agreement to learn how it affects the Department of the 
Navy with respect to using the PPV agreement as a template for other military housing 
privatization projects.   
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the elements that make up Transaction 
Costs Economics (TCE) can play a significant role in how the Department of Defense 
(DoD) would structure contracts for privatization of military housing.  This chapter will 
build on those theories and explain how they have been applied to DoD military housing 
PPV.  First, DoD would want to limit incentives for either party to act in an opportunistic 
way.  Opportunistic behavior is a situation where one party takes advantage of a position 
which has risen as a result of an exchange.  One way to avoid opportunistic behavior is to 
create a detailed contract or agreement that would contain all specific instances of 
opportunistic behavior which would be a very detailed.  This, is inherently impossible; 
the problem is that the contract or agreement lacks all the details needed to avoid 
specificity or opportunism. (Rubin, 1990)  For example, what compensation would or 
should the DoD make if a military base is closed during the term of the contract?  How 
should the DoD protect itself from opportunistic behavior arising from unforeseen 
circumstances?   
The first part of this chapter discusses what Navy Complex San Diego did to 
minimize risk of opportunistic behavior.  We first examine the PPV agreement and the 
process the Navy Region Southwest used to structure the PPV agreement and examine 
how those decisions were or were not influenced by Transaction Cost Economics.  The 
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next section identifies and discusses specific instances of opportunistic behavior that the 
Navy Region Southwest sought to avoid.   
B. NAVY REGION SOUTHWEST CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT 
When the Department of the Navy (DON) sought alternatives to remedy the 
housing shortage that was plaguing the San Diego area, a positive experience that it had 
in Everett, WA was the Public Private Venture (PPV).  Navy Facilities (NAVFAC) 
studied the lessons learned from the Everett PPV and set out to create an agreement that 
would build on its successes.  NAVFAC wanted to lengthen the timeframe of the 
agreement in order to maximize the opportunities for both the contractor and Navy 
Region Southwest.  Navy Region Southwest wanted to avoid the out of pocket costs 
borne by military family members. (Sorce, 2000)  Rents charged in Everett were below 
market rate; however, that arrangement required the Navy to seek Congressional approval 
for Differential Lease Payments (DLP).  DLP are payments given to either the service 
member or the contractor to make up the difference between the Basic Allowance for 
Housing (BAH) given to the contractor and the agreed upon rental charge.    
The agreement the Navy sought used two steps, 1) a Request for Qualifications 
(RFQ) was submitted to interested parties and 2) a Request for Proposals (RFP) would be 
submitted by those selected to submit bid or proposals.   Both the RFQ and RFP are 
discussed briefly below.  Specific benefits and potential problems with the agreements 
are discussed later in the chapter. 
1.   Request for Qualifications (RFQ) 
Interested parties are invited to submit a statement that outlines their overall 
concept for the development of and their approach to the operation and management of 
the program envisioned.  Specific areas to be addressed are description of past 
performances, with regard to developments of a similar nature, scope and scale.  Other 
areas to be addressed are:  
• Vision Statement 
• Organization/Team Composition 
• Development Qualifications, Experience and Past Performance 
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• Operations and Management Qualifications, Experience and Past 
Performance 
• Qualifications, Experience and Past Performance of Key Program 
Participants 
• Financial Information  (NAVFAC, 1999) 
2.   Request for Proposals (RFP) 
After the Navy received responses to the RFQ, they evaluated them and asked no 
more than four investor/developer teams to each submit a proposal.  The DON would 
select the proposal that would provide the best value. (NAVFAC, 1999)  
3.    Contract Goals Set Out by Navy Region Southwest  
The contract goals set out by the Navy Region Southwest to pursue a PPV were to 
(1) minimize government risk, (2) utilize financial leverage to create family housing, (3) 
obtain life cycle cost savings, (3) avoid selling land and assets to mitigate the risk of 
potential PPV, (4) create high quality, energy efficient designs, (5) ensure adequate unit 
size for each family, (5) ensure safe housing complex, and (6) ensure zero out of pocket 
expenses for rents. (Sorce, 2003)   
a.  Government Risk 
Although the 1996 Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 104-106 
allows the DON to transfer title of Federal property, the DON elected to enter into a long 
term contract of 50 years.  The DON is providing the contractor with a long-term lease to 
minimize the risk of the Navy losing the land due to contractor bankruptcy.  The 50-year 
lease allows the DON to evaluate program outcomes and encourages the contractor to 
develop a vested interest in the overall successes that result from the length of the 
contract (see additional details below).    
b.  Financial Leverage 
The aspects of the financial leverage the Navy Region Southwest chose to 
pursue were covered in chapter II, section F.  In essence, what the Navy wanted to 
accomplish was to shift the burden and risk of obtaining the financing to the contractor.    
The way financial leverage is obtained by the DON is explained in chapter III.  
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c. Selling of Land 
When establishing guidelines for housing privatization, DOD authorized 
the transfer or selling of land for the Public Private Ventures (PPV).  The DON chose not 
to pursue this avenue.  They instead chose an approach that still accomplished a goal of 
providing the contactor a viable interest in the venture but kept the ownership of the land.  
They chose to use an agreement with a 50-year lease, which is 40 years longer than what 
was used for the Everett, Washington housing privatization.  The DON will lease the 
DOD owned land in the San Diego area for a sum of one dollar for the entire term of the 
lease.  By leasing the land for the PPV, the DON has reduced the risk of losing the land 
because DON will retain the land together with “any and all improvements, fixtures, and 
equipment, and any appurtenances thereto, situated on, in and under the land.” 
(NAVFAC, 1999)    
d. Quality, Size, and Safety of Family Housing 
The agreement calls for the contractor to build units in accordance with 
the minimum standards set for family housing on Government land, specifically from the 
Privatization of Family Housing Naval Complex San Diego document, Appendix 1 
(NAVFAC, 1999): 
in accordance with the Final Environmental Assessment for Naval 
Training Center Military Family Housing, dated  February 1999 and the 
Redevelopment Plan for the naval Training Center Redevelopment Project 
approved by the Redevelopment Agency of the City of San Diego, dated 
April 1997.  
The agreement annotates a lengthy list of provisions that ensures the 
Government and service family members receive what is promised -  basically to upgrade 
the standard of military family housing to a level more resembling middle class.   
e.  Zero out of Pocket Expenses 
The agreement has been structured so that the military family member 
pays a rental rate that is equal to Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) less an amount to 
cover normal electric and gas utilities.  Basic utilities (electric and gas) are to be the 
responsibility of the tenant, but within given BAH.  The rental rates are adjusted annually 
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based on the congressional adjustments for BAH payments for the San Diego area.  A 
formula that adjusts rental rates to compensate for normal utility usage (electric and gas) 
are agreed upon by both the DON and the contractor.  
C. EXPLORING TRANSACTIONAL COST THEORY AS IT RELATES TO 
THE NAVAL COMPLEX SAN DIEGO PRIVATIZATION AGREEMENT  
This section will examine the agreement or proposals the Department of the Navy 
(DON) solicited for the Naval Complex San Diego Public Private Venture (PPV).  We 
reviewed the areas that the DON wanted to address in section B.  This section also 
examines the transaction costs associated with the agreement.  We will consider whether 
the Naval Region Southwest can create the type of PPV agreement that will deter 
opportunistic behavior from both the contractor and Navy, limit risk (financial, failure), 
and provide the Navy with a viable financial alternative for military family housing.  As 
noted in Chapter III, as an asset becomes more specific (in this case the both housing and 
the land) and more appropriable rents are created (and therefore the possible gains from 
opportunistic behavior increases), the costs of contracting or agreement will generally 
increase more than the cost of vertical integration. (Klein, 2003)  This condition is 
precisely the opposite of what the DON hopes to achieve with the privatization of family 
housing.  Why is this different than what the theories of transactional costs indicate will 
happen?  Although TCE offers reasons where outsourcing may be preferred, this section 
shall look at the reasons and offer explanations as to why it may be different. 
The DOD has determined that divesting itself from building and managing 
military family housing in favor of Public Private Ventures would be the quickest and 
most economical way to upgrade MFH.  As described in Chapter II, DON has determined 
that the most feasible and economical vehicle is a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC).  
An LLC is an economically enforceable contract which can be enforced through the 
judicial system.   
A long-term contract, intended to avoid ownership responsibilities and still 
provide family housing service, can take two forms.  They are: (1) an explicitly stated, 
legally enforceable contractual guarantee or (2) an implicit contractual guarantee by the 
market mechanism of withdrawing future business if opportunistic behavior occurs. 
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(Klein, 2003)  The second condition is the type of contract that this section explores in 
the following areas, (1) cost of cheating, (2) a restrictions vs. constraints agreement, (3) 
the financial contracting and (4) how the contract follows a transactions cost model.  
1.   Cost of “Cheating” 
Cost of “cheating” is an effective, non-legal way of enforcing a contract, the loss 
to an opportunistic firm’s reputation, as a means for ensuring contracts. (Klien, 2003)  
The DOD can reduce the firm’s tendency to “cheat” by ensuring their rents will increase 
with the rise of the economy.  This is taken care of only by coincidence by Congressional 
increases in the service members’ Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH).  One way to 
ensure the contractor does not perform in an opportunistic fashion is to provide the 
contractor with the maximum amount of rents allowable over the life of the contract.  The 
contractor will then want to maximize returns on investment, and not act in a way that 
would jeopardize their returns by “cheating” on the contract.  Another example of the 
contractor cheating would be to allow non-military members to rent housing units when 
there are enough military members available to rent open units in order to gain higher 
rents.  If the contractor is able to gain a higher rent, a contractor may be tempted to rent 
to the public when they can gain a higher rent than they would receive from a military 
family.   
2.   Restrictions vs. Constraints Agreement  
When studying the Navy Facilities (NAVFAC) Agreement DON used when 
soliciting contractors to join with to create a Public Private Venture (PPV), the Navy’s 
apparent strategy was to provide the contractor with the maximum allowable amount of 
flexibility.  The agreement describes the outcomes the DON wants from the construction 
of family housing, as well as the maintenance and management of the privatized units.  In 
this contract the Navy and Lincoln/Clark have agreed to a list of outcomes.  One outcome 
is the specified amount of rents the contractor shall receive; another outcome for the 
Navy is a specified number of family housing for enlisted personnel and officers.   
An agreement that is inclusive of all possible outcomes would be both impossible 
to write and costly, even if attainable.  What the Navy agreement did was list the 
outcomes that the Navy and Lincoln/Clark both agreed to in the Public Private Venture.  
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Those items that were not included in this list of outcomes are, in effect, “ruled out” of 
the contract.  There are certain tradeoffs with this method of contract negotiating.  One 
advantage is that both parties are more likely to choose outcomes that fit their 
circumstances. (Williamson, 1971)  Along with this flexibility there are certain 
restrictions built into the agreement.  These restrictions are in the form of management 
requirements.  The Navy is demanding high quality property management, in order to 
protect its interests, and requires the firm replace the company if it does not provide the 
agreed outcomes both parties have agreed to.  The agreement constraints are in the form 
of what the firm “must” do.  For example the firm must construct the family housing in 
accordance with Public Law 102-522, 15 USC 2227.  The agreement’s restrictions 
specify what the firm “cannot” do.  For example, the firm cannot charge rent greater than 
the service member’s BAH (including normal utility costs).  
What the Navy did when designing the agreement was to take the lessons learned 
from other PPVs and use them to improve the contract.  It set out to create an agreement 
that did not try to incorporate every possible outcome, but did attempt to guarantee the 
desired outcome and what should not occur.       
3.   Economies of Scale  
The size of the housing development projects are such that large companies with 
property development and management expertise are sought.  Thus far, the firms 
involved have been large well established firms and have involved joint ventures between 
firms that have both experience in building and property management.  In the case of the 
development in the San Diego area, a joint venture was formed between Lincoln Property 
Company (property management) and Clarke Reality Builders (construction).  With this 
type of expertise, DON should save money over the lifetime of the contract since the 
management of the housing will be handled by a professional firm, with tenants who are 
a relatively homogenous population (all military service members).   
  Small military communities (300 or fewer housing units) have been given to 
smaller firms which will follow the same template.   Following these joint ventures’ 
success, the General Services Administration (GSA) has been surveying government 
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tenants and management firms to develop government office buildings to replace old and 
obsolete infrastructure.        
D. EXAMINING OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR AS IT RELATES TO THE 
NAVAL COMPLEX SAN DIEGO CONTRACT 
This section will examine some factors the Navy Region Southwest had to 
contend with when creating an agreement that would deter opportunistic behavior.  As 
described above in Chapter IV and the book, Managing Business Transactions, 
opportunistic behavior is a situation where one party takes advantage of a position which 
has arisen from an exchange of some sort.  These opportunistic behaviors are the result of 
“loopholes” or lack of restrictions within the agreement where the firm can take 
advantage of the situation.  This section of the chapter look at lessons learned from prior 
contracts.  The four areas of concern are length of the contract, how the contract is 
financed, the structure of the joint venture, and the implications of contractor reputation.       
1. Length of the Naval Complex San Diego Agreement 
The Navy Region Southwest agreement called for a land lease of 50 years.  When 
the Department of the Navy (DON) first entered in the Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative (MPHI) in Everett, Washington, the contract period was ten years.  This short 
period did not work for the contractor.  One reason is the contractor did not have a vested 
interest in the outcomes of the project.  For instance, the contractor would finance a large 
portion of the cost of new housing and was guaranteed rents for only the ten year period.  
This would be an incentive for the contractor to let the housing maintenance slip to 
increase profits.  This type of shirking can also be called opportunistic behavior where 
the contractor may take advantage of the short contract by 1) building substandard 
housing and 2) reducing the amount of maintenance provided in order to have higher cash 
flows during the course of the contract.    
In order to minimize the opportunistic behaviors NAVFAC extended the length of 
the lease to 50 years with the DON still retaining the residual rights to the land and 
existing infrastructure.  By increasing the agreement to a period of 50 years, NAVFAC 
created a vested interest with the contractor to build suitable homes and to provide 
adequate maintenance for them.  Rubin (Managing Business Transactions) suggests that 
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“the greater the level of specific investment needed in a series of contracts, the greater the 
benefits of long term contracts.”  Although long term contracts still include possibilities 
of opportunism, they can be mitigated with specific constraints or restrictions.  The 
contractors have some residual rights to the property, although the government still owns 
the land and buildings.  This is partially accomplished by guaranteeing rents for a longer 
period of time, giving the contractor an interest in preserving this cash flow.  Sam 
Merrick who is a general manager with Lincoln/Clark emphasized in an interview in the 
Journal of Property Management that: 
 …in our experience, it takes a substantial investment and long-term 
planning to have a successful program and this is not a program that a 
company should undertake as a short-term investment.  You need 
significant resources to be successful.             
2. Financing of the Contract  
This type of PPV has been seen as an opportunity for contracting firms, such as 
Clark/Pinnacle, Lincoln/Clark, and Picerne to receive steady profits over long periods of 
time.  For example, using the housing privatization in the San Diego area, if one assumes 
90% of the 3,248 units are occupied at any given time (2,923 units) and given average 
basic allowance for housing (BAH) of $16,000 per family then, ignoring inflation and 
increases in BAH, Lincoln/Clark could expect to receive $46.8 million a year or $2.34 
billion over the course of the contract.  These amounts provide the firm with relatively 
low risk, positive cash flows.  These numbers are based on an average BAH, but could 
depend on what pay grades are attracted to live in the privatized housing units.     
3.   Joint Venture 
The creation of a joint venture between the DON and Lincoln/Clark reduces the 
possibility for opportunism.  When considering this issue, one needs to determine who is 
bearing the risk for the Military Privatization Housing Initiative (MPHI).  The majority of 
the financial risk is borne by Lincoln/Clark, who would lose a large investment if the 
project failed.  By creating a joint venture with Lincoln/Clark, both entities benefit 
because DON obtains adequate family housing, while the contractor receives guaranteed 
cash flows for an extended period of time.  “Any attempt by either party to exploit the 
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venture will impose costs on both parties since both own assets of the joint venture.” 
(Rubin, 1990)   
4.    Contractor’s Reputation 
Lincoln/Clark’s performance will be of great importance in any future joint 
ventures.  Reputation does have some weight in limiting the opportunistic behavior.  As 
described above, the MFPI contractor in Everett, WA could have used the contract to 
make a one-time profit of the rental cash flows while the maintenance and operation 
standards were allowed to deteriorate.  This behavior may lesson the likelihood of a 
contractor ever receiving another government, state or municipal contract.  Pride in one’s 
reputation will limit opportunistic behavior, and can be used to apply pressure for 
positive results.  For example, the agreement has provisions for the family members, 
living in the housing, to provide feedback on the quality, maintenance, and management 
of the housing.  This feedback is used to measure how well Lincoln/Clark is performing.  
If Lincoln/Clark does not receive adequate feedback from its customers, DON will 
intervene to determine the problem, thus again limiting any shortcuts or opportunistic 
behavior. 
Performance incentives, structured into the contract, provide means for 
Lincoln/Clark to increase its profits and reputation for performance.  Under the Cascade 
of Funds described in Chapter III, Property Management fees are based on performance 
indicators such as independent satisfaction surveys, housing turnaround times, service 
request response times, and semi-annual inspections conducted by independent 
inspectors.  These benchmarks are also collected and sent to the DoD as a basis of 
assessing how well MHPI is performing. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the major aspects that DON felt were important when 
seeking public firms as partners for a Public Private Venture (PPV).  The main purpose 
was to reduce the financial risk of the DOD leaving the public firms with the burden of 
obtaining the bulk of the financing needed.  Another objective was to ensure that the 
DOD retained the deed to the land in the San Diego area if the PPV were to dissolve.  
Also, DON intended to obtain adequate military housing for its service members.  
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Finally, DON aimed for housing provisions much faster than using the Military 
Construction (MILCON) approach. 
The next section examined aspects of the contract Navy Region Southwest used to 
partner with Lincoln/Clark to build family housing.  These aspects minimize unintended 
costs that manifest themselves within contract execution and must be considered 
transactions costs.  These aspects were explored, explained, and the approach NAVFAC 
used to minimize or eliminate these costs was explained.  Lincoln/Clark could expect to 
receive steady and stable positive cash flows over the term of the agreement, which alone 
provides a significant incentive to remain within the partnership.   
The final section described different aspects of opportunism and how these affect 
the agreement between the DON and Lincoln/Clark.  The areas that were explored were 
contract finance and contractor reputation.  The joint nature of the contract ensures a 
vested interest, in the outcomes for the service members, DON, and Lincoln/Clark.  
Finally, the high visibility of the agreement leads to contractor reputation being on the 
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VI.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM PUBLIC PRIVATE VENTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It’s been over six years since the Navy embarked on a partnership with private 
developers to revitalize its military housing inventory.  As expected, it has not been a 
perfect venture without any challenges.  Based on lessons learned, the Navy has and 
continues to refine its planning and execution of the housing privatization program.    
This chapter will discuss the Navy’s public-private venture lessons learned management 
process.  The Navy Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) collects and 
disseminates lessons learned to improve practices in executing the Military Housing 
Privatization Initiative (MHPI) program.  Furthermore, the chapter seeks to detail an 
assessment of the Navy’s Public Private Ventures (PPV) program and to answer the 
question whether those lessons learned help NAVFAC to improve its business practices 
or to prevent the recurrence of significantly adverse outcomes.  
B. THE PROJECT MANAGER GUIDE 
Since the inception of the housing privatization program, NAVFAC Special 
Venture Acquisition (SVA) office has systematically collected, maintained, and 
disseminated lessons learned from executing partnerships with private developers.  Much 
of that performance information tips for success, and good practice examples were 
streamlined, continuously updated, and incorporated into a living document called “The 
Project Manager Guide to Success.”  NAVFAC SVA uses the guide to educate the 
housing privatization personnel, acculturate them to a new and evolving method of 
operations, and stimulate further discussion, innovation, and improvement in the 
privatization process.  When asked about the Project Manager Guide and lessons learned, 
Mr.  Rick Flansburg, a Navy civilian expert in housing privatization wrote: 
We publish additional guidance/lessons learned every six months via 
updates to our PM Guide.  We at NAVFAC SVA have a representative 
working with our field components throughout project life span: 
feasibility, development, source selections, exclusive negotiations, 
development period (construction), and stabilized operations.  Within 
SVA we meet weekly to review project progress, resolve issues, and to 
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anticipate next steps. As lessons learned of changes/additions to guidance 
are identified, these are coordinated within SVA and applied immediately 
to ongoing projects.  Additionally, they are captured and issued with 
updates to the PM Guide. (Flansburg, 2004) 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
1.   Documented Lessons Learned    
As discussed in the previous section, many lessons or experiences were recorded 
and reported up the chain.  The below listed lessons were documented in the recent 
Program Evaluation Plan submitted to Congress: 
• Regional Deal-early coordination between the Activity and Regional 
leadership, the Engineering Field Activities Restate and Acquisition, 
Special Ventures Acquisition and CNI Housing is essential for successful 
execution.  Due to these Regional deals crossing state lines, working very 
early in the process with Local and State authorities is essential. 
• Post PPV management and organizational structures should be developed 
well in advance of transaction. 
• Accurate, defendable requirements critical to obtaining project approval. 
• Coordinate joint Housing Market Analysis (HMA) in locations where 
more than one service is privatizing housing. 
• Continue to include senior enlisted and other local staff in the PPV 
process. 
• Periodic Joint Service privatization meetings are beneficial for sharing 
lessons learned and discussing new issues.  (PEP, 2003) 
2. Field Experiences and Undocumented Lessons Learned  
The past six years yielded other lessons that eventually led to changes in tactics.  
First, the Navy has learned the value of economy of scale in regional deals.  It has found 
a significant advantage in combining installations and putting all of those housing 
inventories under a single package.  Large packages are more attractive to developers and 
are less expensive per unit than small ones to execute. (Flansburg, 2004) 
Second, the Navy discovered that its referral system was opposite to the Marine 
Corps’.  For Navy family housing, the base housing organization receives notice of 
vacancies from the property manager, and it responds by forwarding names of referrals to 
the property manager. In contrast, when vacancies become available in privatized Marine 
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Corps housing, the property manager draws directly from the electronic wait list 
maintained by the housing organization.  Currently, the housing privatization staff is 
leaning toward the adoption of the Marine Corps referral system in order to speed up the 
process and increase occupancy. (Flansburg, 2004) 
Third, the housing privatization staff experienced the real business of property 
management.    Early projects in San Diego had some problems getting service members 
to pay their rent.  Many would skip out on the last month's rent.  The staff had anticipated 
this by requiring either a month's deposit - or - the service member had to sign up for an 
allotment.  However, the region and installation thought that this was a hardship for those 
currently living in the homes and the project manager did not insist on either a deposit or 
an allotment.  According to Mr. Flansburg, lost rental revenue for San Diego was over 
$2M for the first year of privatized operations.  Now, lost rent is considered an accepted 
operational parameter in the business, but not to this extent.  All new projects the 
privatized housing and property management now require either a month's deposit, or the 
service member has to sign up for an allotment.  (Flansburg, 2004) 
D. NAVFAC SELF-ASSESSMENT 
The Navy thinks they are executing the MHPI program soundly and its PPV 
program is on track to eliminate the Navy’s inadequate housing problem by 2007.  To 
date the PPV has not experienced any contract protests from private developers.  That’s a 
good thing, since protests mean litigation and delays to the program (Flansburg, 2004).  
To properly monitor and assess the PPV’s health and make adjustments, NAVFAC SVA 
Division emphasizes the following four areas: Quantity, Quality, Cost, and Time. 
1.   Quantity 
As the MHPI has gained momentum, more family housing units are either being 
placed in use or under construction.  Thus far 74,153 units (see figure below) have been 
awarded.  62,254 units will be privatized over the next three years under pending 








1996 1 404 
1997 1 185 
1998 1 420 
1999 1 2,663 
2000 5 2,222 
2001 4 10,929 
2002 4 9,353 
2003 10 28,915 
2004 12 19,062 
Total   74,153 
 
Table 4.   Number of Projects Awarded Per Year 
With this scope of housing privatization and the large number of units, there are 
several items that each service is required to report to DoD.  These items all fall under a 
heading of product size.  There are 11 items that are reportable in the PEP:  
• Total number of base housing units before privatization.  Provides an 
inventory baseline.   
• Total number of units transferred.  Existing units that are slated to be 
transferred to successful bidders.  
• Total number of units replaced.  Actual number of units that will be 
replaced in the MPHI project. 
• Total number of units renovated.  Number of units deemed inadequate 
that will be renovated. 
• Total number of units with no initial work required.  Units that do not 
need renovation and are ready for occupancy.  
• Deficit Reduction.  Total number of housing units counted toward 
reducing installation housing deficit.   
• Total number of units demolished or sold without replacement.  Units 
that will not be replaced. 
• Total number of units privatized.  Total number of units that will be 
available after completion of the MHPI project phases. 
• Total number of inadequate units eliminated.  Units deemed inadequate 
by the service, includes those units being renovated and demolished. 
• Projected date all inadequate units are eliminated.  Projected date used 
for Community Development Management Plan (CDMP). 
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• Total number of base housing units after privatization.  Total number 
of housing units that will be available after MHPI development project. 
(DoD MHP, 2004) 
All of the items listed above help to manage the many different MHPI projects in 
various regions.  The metrics used are used as a management control system with which 
managers can keep their finger on the pulse of different projects and perhaps intervene 
when needed.  The next area considered is important because of the speed at which 
family housing is being transferred, as noted by Mr. Flansburg, NAVFAC HQ:  
We are executing more projects at a faster pace that ever before.  We are 
able to do so as we've staffed at an appropriate level both at HQ and the 
Field and we've developed standard processes/documents and issued 
written guidance to all staff.  Our HQ staff is primarily charged with 
insuring conformance to the standards. (Flansburg, 2004) 
2.   Quality 
It is difficult to measure quality since it has many subjective components.  What 
really is measured?  DoD has chosen to measure quality by determining whether the 
tenant chooses to move into the housing unit or whether it was assigned to them.  
Additionally, the way they measure tenant satisfaction is different, through 
comprehensive surveys.  The survey at each project site is different, but the results, 
overall tenant satisfaction, are tracked.  In the early stages of Public Private Ventures, the 
overall quality of new housing units has been more than adequate.  It has not been a 
difficult task to improve quality since the majority of housing being replaced is in 
disrepair and old (originally built in the 1940s and 1950s).  Whether the quality of 
housing remains high over the life of the agreement is still to be determined.  
What DoD is trying to accomplish at many of the bases is a community that 
provides child care, teen centers, and sometimes gymnasiums.  The individual services, 
as well as the DoD, have recognized that these types of communities provide quality of 
life improvements that military member families have requested satisfaction surveys.   
Below is how Mr. Flansburg describes the DoD process, and quality of the family 
housing:     
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We believe that our processes are the most efficient of the DoD 
components.  Developers incur less cost and have a clear understanding of 
our intent.  We have never received a protest on a selection.  Our 
documents are well researched, documented, and are based on standard 
templates.  The quality of product is superb.  Military Families are 
overjoyed with the new homes and sense of community.” (Flansburg, 
2004) 
3.   Cost  
Even before DoD becomes a partner with a contractor, the economics of any 
project are evaluated in detail to determine whether or not it is fiscally advantageous to 
proceed. Two primary considerations are life cycle cost for privatization (compared to 
traditional methods) and the leverage of government funds achieved.  When assessing 
whether the MHPI has been a successful venture, managers point to savings with PPV 
leverage.  Many MHPI projects have started with only one-eighth of total costs incurred 
by DoD; this leverage has been the best indicator of initial successes of the programs.  
According to Mr. Flansburg, “costs have regularly decreased, as a percentage of total 
development costs over the past several years.”  The trends are tracked through the MHPI 
Program Evaluation Plan which requires the contractors to report mortgage details, debt 
coverage ratio, and government return on investment.  Although projects vary in size, the 
government return on investment normalizes and provides a basis for comparison.  
Larger, regional projects are driving larger project sizes with the same or similar level of 
pre-execution due diligence and legal work.  
4.   Time 
In order to reach the DoD’s goal of having adequate housing by 2010, the DoD 
tracks what is called cycle time.  Cycle time measures the time it takes to get through five 
different stages, 1) concept development, 2) source selection, 3) exclusive negotiations 4) 
approvals/signatures, and 5) operations and maintenance funds transfer plans and actual 
funds transfer.  When the MHPI first began, the cycle times were 24-40 months. Cycle 
times have pared down to 16 months.  Now that there are many players in the MHPI and 
source selection is not required for follow-on phases, cycle times are standardized on a 12 
month execution timeframe (Flansburg, 2004).  The following graph depicts the Navy 






























































Figure 9.   Execution times for PPVs 
 
E. LESSONS LEARNED ASSESSMENT  
Review of the Navy’s PPV lessons learned process and the lessons documented in 
the PEP, answers the question:  Are we getting better at executing the PPV deals?  The 
data we were able to gather, seem to suggest that the Navy has slowly, but surely, learned 
from the mistakes in earlier projects and continued to refine its business practices.  The 
property management mistakes inherited from the San Diego project proved that the 
Navy could learn from its missteps and then take corrective actions necessary to improve 
and prevent similar recurrences. 
The Navy’s decision to combine many installations housing inventories under 
regional deals (to drive down costs) proves that it has realized the lessons learned.  This 
action also means that the Navy has done its homework well and is getting better at the 
PPV process.  
Moreover, the increased number of PPV projects that the Navy has embarked on 
since 1996, and the time it has taken to execute those deals, provide solid evidence that 
it’s continuously getting better at handling the housing privatization tasks.  For example, 
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NAVFAC SVA has developed schedule templates and closely worked with other staffs in 
the field to drive down the execution timeframe from 24 to 40 months to a more 
standardized 16-months.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter provides some insight of NAVFAC’s lessons learned management 
system and its continuing process to refine the best practice for the PPV.  Through a 
formal (the semi-annual Performance Evaluation Plan) and an informal in-house process 
(Project Manager Guide to Success); NAVFAC has instituted a systematic process to 
document past mistakes from earlier projects and performance information.  The 
information, then, is refined and fed back to the field via tips for success or best practice 
templates in order to obtain better deals with private developers.  
The Navy’s accomplishment so far in the PPV program has proven that its lessons 
learned management is well structured and that the Navy has used these learned lessons 
to successfully improve its housing privatization undertaking.  There are four points to 
support this notion.  One, the Navy has continued to privatize and renovate more 
inadequate housing with more deals coming.  Two, it has and continues to enjoy good 
relationships with private builders.  And it believes that the quality of the privatized 
housing has been greatly improved, citing customer satisfaction and the high standard of 
the newly constructed housing.  Three, the Navy has been able to combine regional deals 
to reduce cost.  And last but not least, it has successfully reduced the cycle time required 
to close the deal on projects.      
Based on the limited data provided from NAVFAC, we can conclude that the 
Navy has worked to apply best practices in executing its housing privatization program 
through a lessons learned system process.  The transition from military housing to 
privatized housing is no doubt a dynamic, evolving, time-consuming, and costly process.  
Sharing lessons learned and knowledge will definitely contribute significantly to the 
success of the Navy Public Private Ventures program.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study provided a background of military family housing issues and concerns 
and current Department of Defense privatization initiatives to modernize and construct 
quality housing.  Additionally, this study focused on Navy privatization initiatives and 
how the concepts of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) could be applied when forming 
future partnerships with private industry.  
B. PUBLIC PRIVATE VENTURE 
1.   Conclusions 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has overcome many obstacles in implementing 
various privatization programs.  Some of these were Congressional budget scoring 
guidelines, less than favorable reports from the Government Accountability Office, and 
queries from Congress as to the success and benefits of the program.   
Despite the challenges with implementing a new and untried program, DoD has 
made significant strides in renovating and building quality housing for military families 
since the enactment of the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act.  The twelve 
authorities the Act created have resulted in the privatization of over 55,000 units as of 
December 2003, with over 100,000 units expected by the end of fiscal year 2004 (PEP, 
2003). 
DoD devolved the privatization program to the Services to allow tailoring for 
each component’s unique culture, and to speed up implementation.  Their current role is 
that of overall coordinator and information conduit to senior DoD leadership and 
Congress.  It appears that sufficient time has elapsed to allow for a more hands-on 
approach on the part of DoD.   
2.   Recommendations 
Rotate Service-level MHPI managers among the Services for three to six months 
to observe, participate in, and learn each other’s business practices and policies.  The 
knowledge gained may help fine tune the program and allow for first hand presentation 
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and insertion of ideas and knowledge gained from experienced MHPI practitioners.  This 
may also serve as an interim step for obtaining Service component buy-in to DoD 
privatization direction as detailed in the following paragraph.  
DoD promulgate Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) best practices 
for adoption Department-wide.  The DoD privatization office has already identified 
challenges and successes for all the Services through DoD’s semi-annual Program 
Evaluation Plan (PEP) submission to Congress.  Additionally, MHPI efforts among the 
Services are intensifying and a lengthy delay (18 to 24 months) by DoD may be too late 
to positively impact future MHPI initiatives. 
Determine the feasibility of applying Navy MHPI to other Federal agencies.  
MPHI efforts appear to be achieving unprecedented success in providing quality housing 
and service and support enhancements based on the findings in this analysis.  The Navy’s 
innovative use of the joint venture authority provided by Congress may also be beneficial 
to other types of Federal projects.  One example would be the construction and/or 
renovation of new Federal buildings and offices.  Any excess space may then be made 
commercially available to generate ongoing income to offset construction/renovation 
efforts. 
DoD develop measures to phase out of military family housing (MFH) altogether.  
The logic behind this recommendation is MFH is not a core mission to the defense of the 
United States.  Furthermore, the private sector appears to be managing government 
housing in a superior manner as evidenced by recent privatization successes.  
Additionally, phasing out of this program will reduce DoD’s logistics footprint and 
eliminate the associated infrastructure and life cycle costs.  This would come at a time 
when the Government is facing funding shortfalls due to the Federal deficit and the 
looming Social Security Fund shortfall. 
C. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
1.   Conclusion 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Theory has provided some illuminating 
insight into the success of the Navy’s privatization program.  In its most basic form, TCE 
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is a common sense approach taken by savvy managers in the course of making decisions.  
It is clearly evident that senior Navy management operated in a manner to minimize 
opportunistic behavior when establishing partnerships with private industry.  
2.   Recommendations   
Institute Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) participation in all DoD MHPI 
similar to the Navy process documented in its memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
with the DCAA.  (See Chapter III, Section D for a more detailed discussion of this 
MOU.)  This effort would aid in establishing internal management controls, provide third 
party auditing, and serve as a balancing mechanism to DoD consultants.  Furthermore, 
opportunistic behavior on the part of consultants has the potential to be substantially 
reduced.  An added benefit of utilizing DCAA services is that they are already tasked by 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) with performing advisory and auditing 
services to all DoD components responsible for procurement and administration.  
Additionally, no additional funds would be required from their customers, thus far. 
DoD consider adopting the “Cascade of Funds” model to future initiatives.  (See 
Chapter III, Section H for a discussion on this model.)  This model may aid in 
minimizing opportunistic behavior by private partners.  It does this by providing financial 
incentives to private partners and/or subcontracted entities to optimize productivity and 
performance.  These incentives would come from the awarding of excess cash flows 
generated as a result of a properly managed project coupled with documented superior 
service by satisfied tenants.  
When feasible, 50-year partnerships should become standard for all future Public 
Private Ventures (PPVs).  Lengthy partnerships will encourage contractor commitment to 
the success of the housing project and will more readily attract financial lending 
institutions that are seeking a more stable and extended income stream.  Additionally, the 
long-term focus would serve to minimize opportunistic behavior among partners who 
would otherwise attempt to maximize their return on investment for shorter time periods. 
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D. LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS  
1.   Conclusion 
The Navy, as well as the other Services, have always dealt with the lack of 
corporate knowledge due to the transient nature of assigned personnel.  The NAVFAC 
Special Venture Acquisition (SVA) Division has implemented a dynamic lessons learned 
process to overcome this weakness.  The SVA has developed a Project Managers (PM) 
Guide that appears to have proven beneficial to the success of subsequent projects.  The 
PM Guide is maintained in an electronic format and is updated and distributed semi-
annually by the SVA Division.   
2.   Recommendations 
The Navy should continue this process.  It appears to be one of the key elements 
contributing to the success of its privatization initiatives.  The culture that the SVA has 
created allows for candid feedback about failures along with the successes from field 
representatives is praiseworthy. 
The tenets of TCE are being used by the Navy in an indirect fashion, but should 
be studied and used more directly as an aid in the lessons learned process.  
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study focused on Navy privatization efforts.  It would be useful to explore 
Army and Air Force privatization efforts in order to document their best practices and/or 
shortcomings.  The application of TCE theory to their initiatives may also help improve 
their efforts.  Additionally, this study would help document their processes for future 
analysis, improvement, and implementation. 
The PM template, along with some details on how best to implement it into an 
organization, may be extremely valuable to organizations engaged in a variety of projects 
and initiatives. Therefore, the lessons learned process should be documented and 




• method of data collection, 
• analysis techniques, 
• data filtering, 
• data dissemination, and  
• culture created to solicit candid feedback.   
F. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Since the enactment of the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, Department 
of Defense privatization efforts have proven to be successful.  Feedback from tenant 
surveys has also been overwhelmingly positive.  Furthermore, Military Family Housing 
Privatization Initiatives (MHPI) are meeting or exceeding associated metrics in the areas 
of housing shortage elimination, leveraging of Federal funds with private sector dollars, 
and reduced life cycle costs over previous military construction costs (PEP, 2003). 
Additionally, the Department of Defense has deftly managed individual Service 
initiatives and can now serve as a catalyst for implementing successful practices across 
all the Services.  Lastly, NAVFAC SVA Division’s application of TCE theory and their 
in-house lessons learned process has played a part in the Navy’s privatization successes 
































APPENDIX A.  EXCERPT OF USC FOR MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
10 USC CHAPTER 169. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY 
FAMILY HOUSING  
 
 
SUBCHAPTER IV. ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING  
 
 
10 United States Code USC § 2871 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2871. Definitions  
 
In this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.]:  
  (1) The term "ancillary supporting facilities" means facilities related to military 
housing units, including facilities to provide or support elementary or secondary 
education, child care centers, day care centers, tot lots, community centers, housing 
offices, dining facilities, unit offices, and other similar facilities for the support of 
military housing.  
 (2) [Deleted]  
 (3) The term "construction" means the construction of military housing units and 
ancillary supporting facilities or the improvement or rehabilitation of existing units or 
ancillary supporting facilities.  
 (4) The term "contract" includes any contract, lease, or other agreement entered into 
under the authority of this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.].  
(5) The term "eligible entity" means any private person, corporation, firm, 
partnership, company, State or local government, or housing authority of a State or local 
government.  
(6) The term "Fund" means the Department of Defense Family Housing Improvement 
Fund or the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing Improvement 
Fund established under section 2883(a) of this title.  
(7) The term "military unaccompanied housing" means military housing intended to 
be occupied by members of the armed forces serving a tour of duty unaccompanied by 
dependents and transient housing intended to be occupied by members of the armed 
forces on temporary duty.  
(8) The term "United States" includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
  
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 544; Oct. 17, 1998, P.L. 105-261, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, 
§ 2803, 112 Stat. 2202; Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2803(a), 113 Stat. 848.)  
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(As amended Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 2803(b), 
116 Stat. 2705; Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div A, Title X, Subtitle E, § 1043(c)(6), 
117 Stat. 1612.)  
 
 
 10 USC § 2872 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2872. General authority  
 
In addition to any other authority provided under this chapter [10 USC § § 2801 et seq.] 
for the acquisition or construction of military family housing or military unaccompanied 
housing, the Secretary concerned may exercise any authority or any combination of 
authorities provided under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.] in order to provide 
for the acquisition or construction by eligible entities of the following:  
(1) Family housing units on or near military installations within the United States and 
its territories and possessions.  
(2) Military unaccompanied housing units on or near such military installations.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 545; Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2803(b), 113 Stat. 849.) 
 
  
10 USC § 2872a (2003)  
 
 
§ 2872a. Utilities and services  
 
(a) Authority to furnish. The Secretary concerned may furnish utilities and services 
referred to in subsection (b) in connection with any military housing acquired or 
constructed pursuant to the exercise of any authority or combination of authorities under 
this subchapter if the military housing is located on a military installation.  
 
(b) Covered utilities and services. The utilities and services that may be furnished under 
subsection (a) are the following:  
 
(1) Electric power.  
(2) Steam.  
(3) Compressed air.  
(4) Water.  
(5) Sewage and garbage disposal.  
(6) Natural gas.  
(7) Pest control.  
(8) Snow and ice removal.  
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(9) Mechanical refrigeration.  
(10) Telecommunications service.  
(11) Firefighting and fire protection services.  
(12) Police protection services.  
 
(c) Reimbursement.  
 
(1) The Secretary concerned shall be reimbursed for any utilities or services furnished 
under subsection (a).  
(2) The amount of any cash payment received under paragraph (1) shall be credited to 
the appropriation or working capital account from which the cost of furnishing the 
utilities or services concerned was paid. Amounts so credited to an appropriation or 
account shall be merged with funds in such appropriation or account, and shall be 
available to the same extent, and subject to the same terms and conditions, as such funds.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, § 1, 114 Stat. 1654.)  
(As amended Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 2802(a), 
116 Stat. 2703.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2873 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2873. Direct loans and loan guarantees  
 
(a) Direct loans.  
(1) Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary concerned may make direct loans to an 
eligible entity in order to provide funds to the eligible entity for the acquisition or 
construction of housing units that the Secretary determines are suitable for use as military 
family housing or as military unaccompanied housing.  
(2) The Secretary concerned shall establish such terms and conditions with respect to 
loans made under this subsection as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the 
interests of the United States, including the period and frequency for repayment of such 
loans and the obligations of the obligors on such loans upon default.  
 
(b) Loan guarantees.  
(1) Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary concerned may guarantee a loan made to 
an eligible entity if the proceeds of the loan are to be used by the eligible entity to 
acquire, or construct housing units that the Secretary determines are suitable for use as 
military family housing or as military unaccompanied housing.  
(2) The amount of a guarantee on a loan that may be provided under paragraph (1) 
may not exceed the amount equal to the lesser of--  
(A) the amount equal to 80 percent of the value of the project; or  
(B) the amount of the outstanding principal of the loan.  
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(3) The Secretary concerned shall establish such terms and conditions with respect to 
guarantees of loans under this subsection as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect 
the interests of the United States, including the rights and obligations of obligors of such 
loans and the rights and obligations of the United States with respect to such guarantees.  
 
(c) Limitation on direct loan and guarantee authority. Direct loans and loan guarantees 
may be made under this section only to the extent that appropriations of budget authority 
to cover their cost (as defined in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 
(2 U.S.C. 661a(5))) are made in advance, or authority is otherwise provided in 
appropriation Acts. If such appropriation or other authority is provided, there may be 
established a financing account (as defined in section 502(7) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 
661a(7))), which shall be available for the disbursement of direct loans or payment of 
claims for payment on loan guarantees under this section and for all other cash flows to 
and from the Government as a result of direct loans and guarantees made under this 
section.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 545; Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2803(c), 113 Stat. 849.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2874 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2874. Leasing of housing  
 
(a) Lease authorized. The Secretary concerned may enter into contracts for the lease of 
housing units that the Secretary determines are suitable for use as military family housing 
or military unaccompanied housing.  
 
(b) Use of leased units. The Secretary concerned shall utilize housing units leased under 
this section as military family housing or military unaccompanied housing, as 
appropriate.  
 
(c) Lease terms. A contract under this section may be for any period that the Secretary 
concerned determines appropriate and may provide for the owner of the leased property 
to operate and maintain the property.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 546.)  
(As amended Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2802(b)(1), (2), 116 Stat. 2703.)  
 
 




§ 2875. Investments  
 
(a) Investments authorized. The Secretary concerned may make investments in an eligible 
entity carrying out projects for the acquisition or construction of housing units suitable 
for use as military family housing or as military unaccompanied housing.  
 
(b) Forms of Investment. An investment under this section may take the form of an 
acquisition of a limited partnership interest by the United States, a purchase of stock or 
other equity instruments by the United States, a purchase of bonds or other debt 
instruments by the United States, or any combination of such forms of investment.  
 
(c) Limitation on value of investment.  
(1) The cash amount of an investment under this section in an eligible entity may not 
exceed an amount equal to 33 1/3 percent of the capital cost (as determined by the 
Secretary concerned) of the project or projects that the eligible entity proposes to carry 
out under this section with the investment.  
(2) If the Secretary concerned conveys land or facilities to an eligible entity as all or 
part of an investment in the eligible entity under this section, the total value of the 
investment by the Secretary under this section may not exceed an amount equal to 45 
percent of the capital cost (as determined by the Secretary) of the project or projects that 
the eligible entity proposes to carry out under this section with the investment.  
(3) In this subsection, the term "capital cost", with respect to a project for the 
acquisition or construction of housing, means the total amount of the costs included in the 
basis of the housing for Federal income tax purposes.  
 
(d) Collateral incentive agreements. The Secretary concerned shall enter into collateral 
incentive agreements with eligible entities in which the Secretary makes an investment 
under this section to ensure that a suitable preference will be afforded members of the 
armed forces and their dependents in the lease or purchase, as the case may be, of a 
reasonable number of the housing units covered by the investment.  
 
(e) Congressional notification required. Amounts in the Department of Defense Family 
Housing Improvement Fund or the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied 
Housing Improvement Fund may be used to make a cash investment under this section in 
an eligible entity only after the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date the 
Secretary of Defense submits written notice of, and justification for, the investment to the 
appropriate committees of Congress or, if earlier, the end of the 14-day period beginning 
on the date on which a copy of the notice and justification is provided in an electronic 
medium pursuant to section 480 of this title.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 546; Nov. 18, 1997, P.L. 105-85, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
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2805, 111 Stat. 1991; Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2803(d), (h)(1), 113 Stat. 849.)  
(As amended Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div A, Title X, Subtitle D, § 1031(a)(50), 117 
Stat. 1602.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2876 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2876. Rental guarantees  
 
The Secretary concerned may enter into agreements with eligible entities that acquire or 
construct military family housing units or military unaccompanied housing units under 
this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.] in order to assure--  
(1) the occupancy of such units at levels specified in the agreements; or  
(2) rental income derived from rental of such units at levels specified in the 
agreements.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 546; Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2803(e), 113 Stat. 849.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2877 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2877. Differential lease payments  
 
Pursuant to an agreement entered into by the Secretary concerned and a lessor of military 
family housing or military unaccompanied housing to members of the armed forces, the 
Secretary may pay the lessor an amount in addition to the rental payments for the housing 
made by the members as the Secretary determines appropriate to encourage the lessor to 
make the housing available to members of the armed forces as military family housing or 
as military unaccompanied housing.  
 
 
10 USC § 2878 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2878. Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities  
 
(a) Conveyance or lease authorized. The Secretary concerned may convey or lease 
property or facilities (including ancillary supporting facilities) to eligible entities for 
purposes of using the proceeds of such conveyance or lease to carry out activities under 
this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.].  
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(b) Inapplicability to property at installation approved for closure. The authority of this 
section does not apply to property or facilities located on or near a military installation 
approved for closure under a base closure law.  
 
(c) Terms and conditions.  
(1) The conveyance or lease of property or facilities under this section shall be for 
such consideration and upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary concerned 
considers appropriate for the purposes of this subchapter and to protect the interests of the 
United States.  
(2) As part or all of the consideration for a conveyance or lease under this section, the 
purchaser or lessor (as the case may be) shall enter into an agreement with the Secretary 
to ensure that a suitable preference will be afforded members of the armed forces and 
their dependents in the lease or sublease of a reasonable number of the housing units 
covered by the conveyance or lease, as the case may be, or in the lease of other suitable 
housing units made available by the purchaser or lessee.  
 
(d) Inapplicability of certain property management laws. The conveyance or lease of 
property or facilities under this section shall not be subject to the following provisions of 
law:  
(1) Section 2667 of this title.  
 
(2) Subtitle I of title 40 [40 USCS § § 101 et seq.] and title III of the Federal Property 
and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 251 et seq.).  
(3) Section 1302 of title 40.  
(4) Section 501 of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11411).  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 547; Nov. 18, 1997, P.L. 105-85, Div A, Title X, Subtitle G, § 
1073(a)(60), 111 Stat. 1903; Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, 
§ 2803(g), 113 Stat. 849; Dec. 28, 2001, P.L. 107-107, Div A, Title X, Subtitle E, § 
1048(d)(1), 115 Stat. 1227; Aug. 21, 2002, P.L. 107-217, 3(b)(23), 116 Stat. 1297.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2879 (2003)  
 
 
[§ 2879. Repealed]  
 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES  
This section (Act Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 547) was repealed by Act Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div B, Title 
XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 2802(c)(1), 116 Stat. 2703. It provided for the interim lease of 




10 USC § 2880 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2880. Unit size and type  
 
(a) Conformity with similar housing units in locale. The Secretary concerned shall ensure 
that the room patterns and floor areas of military family housing units and military 
unaccompanied housing units acquired or constructed under this subchapter [10 USC § § 
2871 et seq.] are generally comparable to the room patterns and floor areas of similar 
housing units in the locality concerned.  
 
(b) Inapplicability of limitations on space by pay grade.  
(1) Section 2826 of this title shall not apply to military family housing units acquired 
or constructed under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.].  
(2) The regulations prescribed under section 2856 of this title shall not apply to any 
military unaccompanied housing unit acquired or constructed under this subchapter [10 
USC § § 2871 et seq.].  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 548.)  
(As amended Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 2806, 
117 Stat. 1722.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2881 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2881. Ancillary supporting facilities 
  
(a) Authority to acquire or construct. Any project for the acquisition or construction of 
military family housing units or military unaccompanied housing units under this 
subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.] may include the acquisition or construction of 
ancillary supporting facilities for the housing units concerned.  
 
(b) Restriction. A project referred to in subsection (a) may not include the acquisition or 
construction of an ancillary supporting facility if, as determined by the Secretary 
concerned, the facility is to be used for providing merchandise or services in direct 
competition with--  
(1) the Army and Air Force Exchange Service;  
(2) the Navy Exchange Service Command;  
(3) a Marine Corps exchange;  
(4) the Defense Commissary Agency; or  
(5) any nonappropriated fund activity of the Department of Defense for the morale, 
welfare, and recreation of members of the armed forces.  
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HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 548; Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2804, 113 Stat. 849.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2881a (2003)  
 
 
§ 2881a. Pilot projects for acquisition or construction of military unaccompanied housing  
 
(a) Pilot projects authorized. The Secretary of the Navy may carry out not more than 
three pilot projects under the authority of this section or another provision of this 
subchapter to use the private sector for the acquisition or construction of military 
unaccompanied housing in the United States, including any territory or possession of the 
United States.  
 
(b) Treatment of housing; assignment of members. The Secretary of the Navy may assign 
members of the armed forces without dependents to housing units acquired or constructed 
under the pilot projects, and such housing units shall be considered as quarters of the 
United States or a housing facility under the jurisdiction of the Secretary for purposes of 
section 403 of title 37.  
 
(c) Basic allowance for housing.  
(1) The Secretary of Defense may prescribe and, under section 403(n) of title 37, pay 
for members of the armed forces without dependents in privatized housing acquired or 
constructed under the pilot projects higher rates of partial basic allowance for housing 
than the rates authorized under paragraph (2) of such section.  
 
(2) The partial basic allowance for housing paid for a member at a higher rate under this 
subsection may be paid directly to the private sector source of the housing to whom the 
member is obligated to pay rent or other charge for residing in such housing if the private 
sector source credits the amount so paid against the amount owed by the member for the 
rent or other charge.  
 
(d) Funding.  
(1) The Secretary of the Navy shall use the Department of Defense Military 
Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund to carry out activities under the pilot 
projects.  
(2) Subject to 90 days prior notification to the appropriate committees of Congress, 
such additional amounts as the Secretary of Defense considers necessary may be 
transferred to the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing Improvement 
Fund from amounts appropriated for construction of military unaccompanied housing in 
military construction accounts. The amounts so transferred shall be merged with and be 
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available for the same purposes and for the same period of time as amounts appropriated 
directly to the Fund.  
 
(e) Reports.  
(1) The Secretary of the Navy shall transmit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report describing--  
(A) each contract for the acquisition of military unaccompanied housing that the 
Secretary proposes to solicit under the pilot projects;  
(B) each conveyance or lease proposed under section 2878 of this title in 
furtherance of the pilot projects; and  
(C) the proposed partial basic allowance for housing rates for each contract as 
they vary by grade of the member and how they compare to basic allowance for housing 
rates for other contracts written under the authority of the pilot programs.  
(2) The report shall describe the proposed contract, conveyance, or lease and the 
intended method of participation of the United States in the contract, conveyance, or 
lease and provide a justification of such method of participation. The report shall be 
submitted not later than 90 days before the date on which the Secretary issues the 
contract solicitation or offers the conveyance or lease.  
 
(f) Expiration. Notwithstanding section 2885 of this title, the authority of the Secretary of 
the Navy to enter into a contract under the pilot programs shall expire September 30, 
2007.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Dec. 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2803(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2703.)  
 
10 USC § 2882 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2882. Assignment of members of the armed forces to housing units  
 
(a) In general. The Secretary concerned may assign members of the armed forces to 
housing units acquired or constructed under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.].  
 
(b) Effect of certain assignments on entitlement to housing allowances.  
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), housing referred to in subsection (a) shall be 
considered as quarters of the United States or a housing facility under the jurisdiction of a 
uniformed service for purposes of section 403 of title 37.  
(2) A member of the armed forces who is assigned in accordance with subsection (a) 
to a housing unit not owned or leased by the United States shall be entitled to a basic 
allowance for housing under section 403 of title 37.  
 
(c) Lease payments through pay allotments. The Secretary concerned may require 
members of the armed forces who lease housing in housing units acquired or constructed 
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under this subchapter to make lease payments for such housing pursuant to allotments of 
the pay of such members under section 701 of title 37.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 548; Nov. 18, 1997, P.L. 105-85, Div A, Title VI, Subtitle A, § 
603(d)(2)(C), 111 Stat. 1783.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2883 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2883. Department of Defense Housing Funds  
 
(a) Establishment. There are hereby established on the books of the Treasury the 
following accounts:  
(1) The Department of Defense Family Housing Improvement Fund.  
(2) The Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing Improvement 
Fund.  
 
(b) Commingling of Funds prohibited.  
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall administer each Fund separately.  
(2) Amounts in the Department of Defense Family Housing Improvement Fund may 
be used only to carry out activities under this subchapter with respect to military family 
housing.  
(3) Amounts in the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing 
Improvement Fund may be used only to carry out activities under this subchapter with 
respect to military unaccompanied housing.  
 
(c) Credits to Funds.  
(1) There shall be credited to the Department of Defense Family Housing 
Improvement Fund the following:  
(A) Amounts authorized for and appropriated to that Fund.  
(B) Subject to subsection (f), any amounts that the Secretary of Defense transfers, 
in such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts, to that Fund from amounts authorized 
and appropriated to the Department of Defense for the acquisition or construction of 
military family housing.  
(C) Proceeds from the conveyance or lease of property or facilities under section 
2878 of this title for the purpose of carrying out activities under this subchapter [10 USC 
§ § 2871 et seq.] with respect to military family housing.  
(D) Income derived from any activities under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et 
seq.] with respect to military family housing, including interest on loans made under 
section 2873 of this title, income and gains realized from investments under section 2875 
of this title, and any return of capital invested as part of such investments.  
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(E) Any amounts that the Secretary of the Navy transfers to that Fund pursuant to 
section 2814(i)(3) of this title, subject to the restrictions on the use of the transferred 
amounts specified in that section.  
(F) Any amounts that the Secretary concerned transfers to that Fund pursuant to 
section 2869 of this title.  
(2) There shall be credited to the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied 
Housing Improvement Fund the following:  
(A) Amounts authorized for and appropriated to that Fund.  
(B) Subject to subsection (f), any amounts that the Secretary of Defense transfers, 
in such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts, to that Fund from amounts authorized 
and appropriated to the Department of Defense for the acquisition or construction of 
military unaccompanied housing.  
(C) Proceeds from the conveyance or lease of property or facilities under section 
2878 of this title for the purpose of carrying out activities under this subchapter [10 USC 
§ § 2871 et seq.] with respect to military unaccompanied housing.  
(D) Income derived from any activities under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et 
seq.] with respect to military unaccompanied housing, including interest on loans made 
under section 2873 of this title, income and gains realized from investments under section 
2875 of this title, and any return of capital invested as part of such investments.  
(E) Any amounts that the Secretary of the Navy transfers to that Fund pursuant to 
section 2814(i)(3) of this title, subject to the restrictions on the use of the transferred 
amounts specified in that section.  
(F) Any amounts that the Secretary concerned transfers to that Fund pursuant to 
section 2869 of this title. 
  
(d) Use of amounts in Funds.  
(1) In such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts and except as provided in 
subsection (e), the Secretary of Defense may use amounts in the Department of Defense 
Family Housing Improvement Fund to carry out activities under this subchapter [10 USC 
§ § 2871 et seq.] with respect to military family housing, including activities required in 
connection with the planning, execution, and administration of contracts entered into 
under the authority of this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.]. The Secretary may also 
use for expenses of activities required in connection with the planning, execution, and 
administration of such contracts funds that are otherwise available to the Department of 
Defense for such types of expenses.  
(2) In such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts and except as provided in 
subsection (e), the Secretary of Defense may use amounts in the Department of Defense 
Military Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund to carry out activities under this 
subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.] with respect to military unaccompanied housing, 
including activities required in connection with the planning, execution, and 
administration of contracts entered into under the authority of this subchapter [10 USC § 
§ 2871 et seq.]. The Secretary may also use for expenses of activities required in 
connection with the planning, execution, and administration of such contracts funds that 
are otherwise available to the Department of Defense for such types of expenses.  
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(3) Amounts made available under this subsection shall remain available until 
expended. The Secretary of Defense may transfer amounts made available under this 
subsection to the Secretaries of the military departments to permit such Secretaries to 
carry out the activities for which such amounts may be used.  
 
(e) Limitation on obligations. The Secretary may not incur an obligation under a contract 
or other agreement entered into under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.] in excess 
of the unobligated balance, at the time the contract is entered into, of the Fund required to 
be used to satisfy the obligation.  
 
(f) Notification required for transfers. A transfer of appropriated amounts to a Fund under 
paragraph (1)(B) or (2)(B) of subsection (c) may be made only after the end of the 30-day 
period beginning on the date the Secretary of Defense submits written notice of, and 
justification for, the transfer to the appropriate committees of Congress or, if earlier, the 
end of the 14-day period beginning on the date on which a copy of the notice and 
justification is provided in an electronic medium pursuant to section 480 of this title.  
 
(g) Limitation on amount of budget authority. The total value in budget authority of all 
contracts and investments undertaken using the authorities provided in this subchapter 
[10 USC § § 2871 et seq.] shall not exceed--  
(1) $ 850,000,000 for the acquisition or construction of military family housing; and  
(2) $ 150,000,000 for the acquisition or construction of military unaccompanied 
housing.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 548; Sept. 23, 1996, P.L. 104-201, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, 
§ 2804, 110 Stat. 2788; Oct. 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2802(b), 113 Stat. 848.)  
(As amended Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div A, Title X, Subtitle D, § 1031(a)(51), Div 
B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 2805(c), 117 Stat. 1603, 1721.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2883a (2003)  
 
 
§ 2883a. Funds for housing allowances of members of the armed forces assigned to 
certain military family housing units  
 
(a) Authority to transfer funds to cover housing allowances. During the fiscal year in 
which a contract is awarded for the acquisition or construction of military family housing 
units under this subchapter that are not to be owned by the United States, the Secretary of 
Defense may transfer the amount determined under subsection (b) with respect to such 
housing from appropriations available for support of military housing for the armed force 
concerned for that fiscal year to appropriations available for pay and allowances of 
military personnel of that same armed force for that same fiscal year.  
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(b) Amount transferred. The total amount authorized to be transferred under subsection 
(a) in connection with a contract under this subchapter may not exceed an amount equal 
to any additional amounts payable during the fiscal year in which the contract is awarded 
to members of the armed forces assigned to the acquired or constructed housing units as 
basic allowance for housing under section 403 of title 37 that would not otherwise have 
been payable to such members if not for assignment to such housing units.  
 
(c) Transfers subject to appropriations. The transfer of funds under the authority of 
subsection (a) is limited to such amounts as may be provided in advance in appropriations 
Acts.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Dec. 28, 2001, P.L. 107-107, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2804(a), 115 Stat. 1305.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2884 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2884. Reports  
 
(a) Project reports.  
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
a report describing--  
(A) each contract for the acquisition or construction of family housing units or 
unaccompanied housing units that the Secretary proposes to solicit under this subchapter 
[10 USC § § 2871 et seq.]; and  
(B) each conveyance or lease proposed under section 2878 of this title.  
(2) The report shall describe the proposed contract, conveyance, or lease and the 
intended method of participation of the United States in the contract, conveyance, or 
lease and provide a justification of such method of participation.  
(3) (A) In the case of a contract described in paragraph (1) proposed to be entered into 
with a private party, the report shall specify whether the contract will or may include a 
guarantee (including the making of mortgage or rental payments) by the Secretary to the 
private party in the event of--  
(i) the closure or realignment of the installation for which housing will be 
provided under the contract;  
(ii) a reduction in force of units stationed at such installation; or  
(iii) the extended deployment of units stationed at such installation.  
(B) If the contract will or may include such a guarantee, the report shall also--  
(i) describe the nature of the guarantee; and  
(ii) assess the extent and likelihood, if any, of the liability of the United States 
with respect to the guarantee.  
(4) The report shall be submitted not later than 30 days before the date on which the 
Secretary issues the contract solicitation or offers the conveyance or lease.  
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(b) Annual reports. The Secretary of Defense shall include each year in the materials that 
the Secretary submits to Congress in support of the budget submitted by the President 
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31 the following:  
 
(1) A report on the expenditures and receipts during the preceding fiscal year 
covering the Funds established under section 2883 of this title.  
(2) A methodology for evaluating the extent and effectiveness of the use of the 
authorities under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.] during such preceding fiscal 
year, and such recommendations as the Secretary considers necessary for improving the 
extent and effectiveness of the use of such authorities in the future.  
(3) A review of activities of the Secretary under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et 
seq.] during such preceding fiscal year, shown for military family housing, military 
unaccompanied housing, dual military family housing and military unaccompanied 
housing, and ancillary supporting facilities.  
(4) If a contract for the acquisition or construction of military family housing, military 
unaccompanied housing, or dual military family housing and military unaccompanied 
housing entered into during the preceding fiscal year did not include the acquisition or 
construction of the types of ancillary supporting facilities specifically referred to in 
section 2871(1) of this title, a explanation of the reasons why such ancillary supporting 
facilities were not included.  
(5) A description of the Secretary's plans for housing privatization activities under 
this subchapter: (A) during the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted; and (B) 
during the period covered by the then-current future-years defense plan under section 221 
of this title.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 550.)  
(As amended Nov. 24, 2003, P.L. 108-136, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 2807, 117 
Stat. 1722.)  
 
 
10 USC § 2885 (2003)  
 
 
§ 2885. Expiration of authority  
 
The authority to enter into a contract under this subchapter [10 USC § § 2871 et seq.] 
shall expire on December 31, 2012.  
 
HISTORY: (Added Feb. 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div B, Title XXVIII, Subtitle A, § 
2801(a)(1), 110 Stat. 551; Nov. 18, 1997, P.L. 105-85, Div A, Title X, Subtitle G, § 
1073(a)(61), 111 Stat. 1903; Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-398, § 1, 114 Stat. 1654; Dec. 28, 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  83
APPENDIX B. CNI COMMAND LOCATIONS 
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APPENDIX C. CNI COMMAND ORGANIZATION 
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